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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to understand and critically evaluate deductivism as a 
theory of inferential sufficiency in informal logic. I distinguish three different types of 
deductivism: strong normative deductivism, weak normative deductivism, and 
reconstructive deductivism. I also discuss some potential justificatory strategies that 
might be invoked in an attempt to justify strong normative deductivism and 
reconstructive deductivism. I apply this categorization scheme to develop an 
interpretation of Leo Groarke’s version of reconstructive deductivism. I then evaluate 
some of the criticisms of deductivism raised in the informal logic literature. I focus in 
particular on the criticisms of Ralph Johnson and Trudy Govier. I follow up this 
evaluation by raising some problems for the justificatory strategies used to support 
deductivism. I also show how these problems apply to Groarke’s reconstructive 
deductivism.
- iii -
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PREFACE
The aim of this thesis is to understand and critically evaluate deductivism as a 
theory of inferential sufficiency in informal logic and argumentation theory. This topic 
raises many important questions. For instance, what is deductivism? How many 
versions of it are there? What justifications might support deductivism? And, do any of 
these justifications work? In this thesis I develop an understanding of deductivism by 
defining some of the different varieties of deductivism and listing potential justificatory 
strategies that might be invoked to support them. I then apply this understanding of 
deductivism to develop an interpretation of Leo Groarke’s version of deductivism. Next I 
examine some of the criticisms that have been raised against Leo Groarke and other 
deductivists from within the informal logic and argumentation theory traditions. In 
particular I examine the criticisms of Trudy Govier and Ralph Johnson. I then develop 
some of my own criticisms of Groarke’s version of deductivism through sequentially 
critiquing the different ways of justifying deductivism. I also assess the possibilities for 
the other versions of deductivism.
Deductivism is a theory of inferential adequacy or sufficiency. Govier says, “to 
be epistemically and logically adequate, an argument must meet two adequacy 
conditions: those concerning its premises and those concerning the inferential link 
between the premises and conclusion” (Govier 1999: p. 107). As I understand it, 
deductivism is a thesis about what standards must be met for an inference to be 
considered good—that is, for an argument’s inferential link to be adequate. Deductivism
viii
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need not make any commitments to a specific theory of premise adequacy, but it does 
need to be complimented by a view about premise adequacy to be a complete theory.
In Chapter One I define three types of deductivism: strong normative 
deductivism, weak normative deductivism, and reconstructive deductivism. I will then 
consider some potential ways that these different versions of deductivism might be 
justified. For strong normative deductivism I consider two possible justificatory 
strategies: the ontological and the psychological. For reconstructive deductivism I 
consider four strategies: the ontological, the psychological, the normative, and the 
pragmatic.
In Chapter II, I point out how deductivism fits within the informal logic tradition. 
I then apply the categorization scheme developed in chapter one to Leo Groarke’s 
account of reconstructive deductivism. I claim that Groarke employs psychological, 
normative, and pragmatic justifications for reconstructive deductivism.
In Chapter III, I examine the criticisms that have been raised in the informal logic 
tradition against deductivism and Groarke’s response to those criticisms. I look at 
Govier’s criticism and claim that while she raises some challenges for deductivism a 
more fully developed version of deductivism, like that developed by Groarke, has ways 
to respond to the challenges she raises. Next, I look at Johnson’s criticism that formal 
logic and deductivism have difficulty meeting the adequacy conditions that a good theory 
of argument must meet. I contend that while Johnson’s criticism are effective criticism 
of formal logic, Groarke’s version of deductivism is more resistant and can make a good 
case that it can satisfy Johnson’s adequacy conditions.
-  IX -
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In the final chapter I develop some of my own criticism to show what I think the 
problems with Groarke’s version of deductivism are. I also consider the promise and 
draw backs of some of the other versions of deductivism. I critique deductivism by 
illustrating the difficulties that arise for each of the justificatory strategies. I also 
illustrate how these difficulties bear on Groarke’s deductivism. I then go on to critique 
strong normative deductivism and evaluate the possibilities for weak normative 
deductivism.
- x -




Deduction is a central concept in logic. Its centrality is evident from its being 
amongst the first concepts that most logic students are taught, and from its being a 
concept whose mastery is essential for the comprehension of, at least, the techniques of 
formal logic. But like many other concepts in the philosophical disciplines, the term 
‘deduction’ is often used in public discourse in a way that does not conform with its use 
in specialized philosophical discourse. In fact, the term ‘deduction’ is commonly applied 
to any inference. Imagine Sherlock Holmes responding to Dr. Watson’s enquires about 
Holmes’ good reasoning with “elementary deduction good sir,” when in fact, if we are 
following the use of ‘deduction’ as a term of art in philosophy and logic, Holmes is not 
doing any deducing whatsoever, but is, rather, ‘inducing’ or ‘abducing’ his conclusions.
Traditionally, deduction has been categorized as one type of reasoning distinct 
from inductive and abductive reasoning. There have been those, however, who have 
defended a view about argument cogency called deductivism which places deductive 
validity at the core of all cogent arguments. Some examples of such defenders of 
deductivism in recent informal logic and argumentation theory literature are Leo Groarke 
(1992, 1995, 1999, 2002), Susan Gerritsen (1994), and Louis Groarke (2000).
The theory of argument cogency is part of the theory of argument. A cogent 
argument, says Govier, “must meet two sorts of [adequacy] conditions: those concerning 
its premises and those concerning the inferential link between its premises and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conclusion” (Govier 1999: p. 107). The different variations of deductivism each propose 
different views on that part of argument cogency that concerns the link between an 
argument’s premises and its conclusion. In other words, they propose different theories 
of inferential adequacy. In this chapter I will present some variations of the deductivist 
theory of inferential adequacy and some of the different claims that could be invoked as 
justification for these different deductivist views.
It will be important to distinguish between that part of the theory of argument 
cogency that concerns an argument’s inference and that part that concerns premise 
acceptability. The different sorts of deductivism must fit with a theory about premise 
acceptability. When a deductivist makes assessments about whether an argument is good 
or not they must, in addition to evaluating the inferential link, also adopt some view 
about the acceptability of the argument’s premises. How premise adequacy is assessed 
would depend on the theory of acceptability that is adopted. In this thesis I will be 
concerned, in particular, with different deductivist views about inferential adequacy. It 
must be recognized that, in order to constitute a fully worked-out theory of evaluation, 
any one version of deductivism must fit with a theory of premise acceptability. In this 
thesis, however, I only discuss the theory of premise acceptability to acknowledge that 
some notion of what makes a premise acceptable is required to fully evaluate arguments. 
As far as I can tell, however, the deductivist need not be committed to one view about 
premise acceptability rather than another.
The aim of this chapter will not be to defend or refute deductivism, but to better 
understand what it is and why someone might be inclined to endorse it. I am not 
suggesting that the justifications of deductivism discussed in this chapter succeed. In
- 2 -
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fact, as we will see in the final chapter, I think there are problems with each one. My 
purpose in this chapter is to achieve greater organization in how we conceptualize 
deductivism. This chapter, if it has succeeded, should yield a useful way of 
conceptualizing deductivism both for those who are inclined to endorse it and for those 
who are critical of it. Often deductivism is simply dismissed as being implausible. Such 
dismissals might amount to the view that ‘surely, contrary to the claim of the 
deductivists, there are non-deductive arguments.’ Whether these dismissals are justified 
or not requires first understanding exactly what the deductivists are claiming, and 
whether or not the reasons supporting their claims are any good. We would not want any 
unwarranted presuppositions to get in the way of sound philosophy, especially when what 
is at stake is the application of a concept which has the centrality in philosophy and in 
logic that ‘deductive argument’ does.
1.2 Defining ‘Deductive Argument’
Copi defines “deductive arguments” as arguments that involve “the claim that 
[their] premises provide conclusive grounds” for their conclusion. He continues by 
dividing deductive arguments into two classes: valid and invalid. “A deductive argument 
is valid when its premises, if true, do provide conclusive grounds for their conclusion, 
that is, [the] premises and conclusion are so related that it is absolutely impossible for the 
premises to be true unless the conclusion is true also” (Copi 1978: p. 32). Validity is 
understood, accordingly, not as an essential property of deductive arguments. Instead 
validity is an essential property of successful deductive arguments; that is to say, it is a 
property of deductive arguments that do not simply “[involve] the claim that [their]
-3  -
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premises provide conclusive grounds” (Copi 1978: p. 32) for their conclusion, but, in 
fact, do provide conclusive grounds. Many authors follow Copi and understand 
deductive arguments as being either valid or invalid, although this is not a requirement of 
a definition of a deductive argument.
We might ask of Copi, and of others who would define deduction similarly, how 
can we determine whether an argument involves the claim that its premises provide 
conclusive grounds for its conclusion? Machina (1985) points out that the sort of 
evaluation that would be needed to determine whether or not an argument involves the 
claim of conclusiveness is not the logical evaluation of the argument, but the 
psychological and contextual investigation of the arguer and the context in which she 
made the argument. The thought is that if an argument can be said to involve the claim 
of conclusiveness, then this could be determined by assessing an arguer’s intentions in 
making their argument or by assessing the argument’s context: did the arguer intend her 
argument to be conclusive or, alternatively, does the context in which the argument was 
made suggest that it is plausible (or implausible) to attribute the purport of 
conclusiveness to the argument? But intention and context are not logical concepts. If 
we accept Machina’s view—as it seems reasonable to do—that purports of 
conclusiveness are psychological and contextual matters, and Copi’s definition of 
‘deductive argument’ as those arguments which include the purport that their conclusion 
follows conclusively from their premises, then ‘deductive argument’ would be a 
psychological and/or contextual concept. The essential characteristics of ‘deductive 
argument’ would not be exclusively logical but the psychological and contextual 
characteristic of ‘involving the purport of conclusiveness’. Machina says, this “sort of
- 4 -
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[psychological and contextual] evaluation of the author is not [the] logical evaluation of 
his argument. . . . Logical evaluation only tells us about the character of the evidentiary 
relation between [the] premises and [the] conclusion [of] a given argument” (Machina 
1985: pp. 573-574).
It seems peculiar that deductive argument would not be a logical concept. A 
definition of deductive argument, however, might take a different approach and 
understand validity to be essential to deductive arguments and, thus, avoid this 
peculiarity. In this way, unlike Copi’s, such a definition of deduction would claim that 
the logical success of an argument is a necessary condition of claiming of the argument 
that it is a deductive argument. Arguments, to be considered deductive arguments 
according to such a definition, must, contra Copi, successfully provide logically 
conclusive grounds for their conclusion. Deductive argument, under this definition, is 
identified with deductively valid argument. This identity between deductive argument 
and deductively valid argument focuses the definition of ‘deductive argument’ on the 
nature of the inference instead of on the psychological and contextual features of the 
argument. Whether or not an argument involves the claim of providing conclusive 
grounds for its conclusion is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the endorsement of the 
inference from the premises to the conclusion be necessary on pain of contradiction.
That is to say: necessarily, given the truth of the premises, the conclusion is true too. In a 
deductive argument one cannot maintain consistency while endorsing the argument’s 
premises and at the same time denying its conclusion.
If an argument does not exhibit this sort of logical success it is difficult to see how 
it has, in any adequate sense of the term, deduced the conclusion from the premises.
-5  -
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Certainly an argument may appear to have a valid inference—and in this way the 
argument might seem to provide conclusive grounds for the conclusion when it does not. 
Actually making a valid inference and providing conclusive grounds for the conclusion is 
another matter entirely. In my view it is better to think of arguments that appear to be 
valid but are not as attempts at deductive arguments and not as instances of them.
Do we say of someone who dropped out of a marathon after the 20th mile that she 
‘ran the marathon’? Or, do we say that she ‘tried to run the marathon’? I think that we 
would say the latter, and I think it is the same with deductions.
It is, therefore, reasonable to consider an argument deductive only when the 
argument makes a deductively valid inference to the conclusion. We can, therefore, 
adopt the following understanding of deductive argument:
Deductive argument is an argument in which the inference from the 
premises to the conclusion is necessary; that is, when there is no consistent 
assignment of truth-values to propositions in the argument that will make 
the premises of the argument true and the conclusion false.
1.3 Defining ‘Deductivism’
I agree with James Heame’s point that deductivism is not one single thesis but “a 
cluster of them” (Heame 1983: p. 205). Based on the variety of theses that can be 
embraced under the label ‘deductivism,’ it is best to approach understanding deductivism 
not by giving one all-encompassing definition but by sketching a map of the conceptual 
terrain. In this section I will sketch such a map by presenting different types of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
deductivism and in the next section I will present different ways of justifying these 
different types of deductivism.
Deductivism can be divided into two broad categories—normative deductivism 
and reconstructive deductivism. Normative deductivism subscribes to some version of 
the maxim that arguments are either ‘deductive or defective.’ On the one hand, a 
normative deductivist might hold the position that all good arguments are deductively 
valid. Call this category strong normative deductivism. The thought here is that 
arguments which are not deductively valid are flawed. Deductive validity is the 
normative standard by which a strong normative deductivist evaluates arguments and 
classes them as good or bad. Any argument that is not deductively valid can be 
dismissed by a strong normative deductivist because that argument has not satisfied the 
normative condition of inferential adequacy.
But, a normative deductivist may have the view, on the other hand, that certain 
non-deductive arguments are logically less defective than others and, therefore—it 
follows immediately—that, for this version of normative deductivism, some non- 
deductive arguments are logically better than other non-deductive arguments. Indeed, 
this sort of normative deductivism may consider some deductively invalid arguments 
logically good, but not as logically good as deductively valid arguments. I will call this 
position weak normative deductivism. Weak normative deductivism adopts the view that 
deductive validity is the highest logical standard of evaluation that an argument can 
satisfy; so the best arguments will be deductively valid ones. Notice, however, that the 
higher the degree of logical goodness that can be attributed to deductively invalid 
arguments the weaker the normative deductivism becomes. Therefore, a weak normative
- 7 -
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deductivist position would collapse, if the sense of logical goodness it attributes to 
deductively invalid arguments is as strong a sense of logical goodness as that attributed to 
deductively valid arguments.
Reconstructive deductivism, on the other hand, does not make any judgments 
about whether a deductively invalid argument is logically good until after the argument 
has been reconstructed as deductively valid. Only after this reconstruction will a 
reconstructive deductivist make any assessment of whether or not the argument under 
evaluation is any good.
A reconstructive deductivist evaluates arguments that are not transparently valid 
through reconstruction and premise assessment. A reconstructive deductivist turns 
deductively invalid arguments into arguments that have necessary inferences which are, 
therefore, deductively valid. The reconstruction of arguments such that they have 
deductively valid inferences is accomplished through the addition of premises that, in 
conjunction with the given premises, make the argument’s inference necessary. That is 
to say, the premises added in reconstruction should change an argument whose 
conclusion could be false when the premises are true into an argument where this is not 
possible. The reconstructive deductivist will then evaluate the deductively invalid 
argument by assessing the acceptability of the argument’s premises. For example, the 
old Socrates argument
Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal 
may be reconstructed by adding the premise
-  8 -
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All men are mortal.
By making the inference deductively valid, the original argument can be evaluated 
through examining the premises of the reconstructed argument. If the premises turn out 
to be acceptable, then the original argument may be considered a good argument. The 
reconstructive deductivist will claim that such a method for the evaluation of arguments 
is applicable to all arguments that are deductively invalid. Arguments that are 
transparently valid are in no need of reconstruction; they are only in need of evaluation.
We are now in a position to define “normative” and “reconstructive deductivism” 
as follows:
Strong Normative Deductivism: the view that the only logically good 
arguments are deductively valid. Deductive validity is the only standard 
by which we evaluate arguments to determine if they are logically good or 
not (that is, if the inference made to the conclusion is good).
Weak Normative Deductivism: the view that deductively valid 
arguments are logically superior to invalid arguments, but that some 
invalid arguments are logically superior to other invalid arguments. The 
highest inferential standard, according to weak normative deductivism, is 
deductive validity.
Reconstructive Deductivism: is a method for evaluating arguments. If a 
given argument is deductively invalid, then its logical strength can be
- 9 -
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assessed in the following way: (1) add a valid-making premise P to the 
given argument; (2) if P is acceptable, then the given argument is logically 
strong; and if P is not acceptable, the given argument is logically weak 
(there may be degrees of statement acceptability which convert to degrees 
of logical strength).
1.4 Justifying Deductivism
Why might one endorse a normative or reconstructive deductivist thesis about 
argument cogency? For the normative deductivist this question amounts to the question, 
why would one think that deductively valid arguments are the best sort of argument?
And for the reconstructive deductivist the question is what reason do we have for 
reconstructing arguments as deductively valid? I want to identify two reasons that might 
motivate strong normative deductivism and four that might motivate reconstructive 
deductivism.
The justifications for deductivism that I will present are ontological, 
psychological, normative, and pragmatic. The first two can apply to strong normative 
deductivism and all four can apply to reconstructive deductivism.
The ontological justification depends on a distinction between the written or 
spoken text of an argument and the argument itself. This position is a sort of Platonism 
about arguments similar to Platonism about numbers and geometrical figures in the 
philosophy of mathematics. In mathematical Platonism, numbers are real entities that are 
denoted by numerals and there are real relationships that exist between numbers that can 
be expressed by symbols in equations and formulas. In mathematical Platonism
-  1 0 -
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numerical and geometrical relationships are discovered, not constructed. Mathematicians 
did not construct the ‘Pythagorean Theorem’ or the ‘Infinitude of Primes’; rather, these 
geometrical and arithmetical relationships were discovered by them. A Platonist about 
arguments would similarly think that arguments are real entities that are discovered, not 
constructed by arguers. Arguers, on this view, “stumble across” or “find” relationships 
between premises and conclusions that already existed but had perhaps never been 
expressed.
One variation on the ontological view about arguments is ontological 
deductivism. An argument, according to ontological deductivism, is a deductively valid 
entity. Therefore, texts that are not deductively valid fail to denote an argument. We can 
proceed to evaluate arguments by reconstructing the text into a deductively valid text that 
denotes an argument. A non-valid text could be reconstructed so that it denotes a (valid) 
argument. This view about the ontological nature of arguments would be one way of 
justifying a method of evaluating texts by reconstructing them to correspond with a 
(valid) argument. Hence, this view would constitute one justification for reconstructive 
deductivism.
Psychological considerations can also be invoked in an effort to justify 
reconstructive deductivism. Call this the psychological justification. Psychological 
considerations are those that involve mental states like intentions and beliefs. While I 
think these considerations can be applied to normative and reconstructive deductivism, I 
will begin by considering their application to reconstructive deductivism. The 
psychological justification takes arguments to be human products. Arguments, according 
to the psychological view, are constructed by arguers. There is a strong and a weak
-11  -
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version of the psychological justification. The strong version adopts the highly 
implausible view that human psychology is such that all arguments produced by humans 
are deductively valid. According to this view every argument is deductively valid 
because humans are built in such a fashion that they can only make deductively valid 
arguments. This view would be immediately falsified if there is one argument that is not 
deductively valid. Since it seems that many arguments are not deductively valid, I will 
not spend anymore time considering this view.
The weak psychological justification for reconstructive deductivism is a little 
more plausible. The weak psychological view is a theory about human cognition that 
postulates that human beings are built in such a way that they always attempt to argue 
deductively. Weak psychological deductivism can be invoked as a reason to reconstruct 
arguments as deductively valid. The idea is that an arguer’s beliefs factor into their 
arguments in such a way that the arguer must be understood as trying to make an 
argument that is deductively valid. The arguer must aim to make her argument a 
deductively valid argument. If all arguments involve beliefs that, once made explicit in 
the form of premises, make an argument deductively valid, then we should reconstmct 
the argument by adding premises that make it deductively valid. We then would have 
invoked a reconstructive deductivist strategy on the grounds of the “psychological” claim 
that all arguers hold beliefs that make their argument an attempt at a deductively valid 
argument.
The ontological and psychological justifications can also be used to justify strong 
normative deductivism. If we accept the ontological deductivist position that all 
arguments are real in a Platonic sense and that all arguments are deductively valid, we
-  1 2 -
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could, instead of reconstructing the invalid text, simply dismiss it. While the text may be 
purported, by some arguer, to be an argument, the text is not deductively valid, so it is in 
fact not an argument. Instead of adopting the reconstructive policy of turning these 
invalid texts into texts that denote (valid) arguments, an ontological deductivist might just 
dismiss them outright. The arguer may think of her text as being an argument, but the 
text fails to denote any argument whatsoever, so it need not be considered to have 
satisfied the standard of logical goodness of argument. Notice that this is a justification 
for strong normative deductivism—a text that is not deductively valid is not good.
Psychological deductivism, as we saw, can be weak or strong. If you are a strong 
psychological deductivist, you would be a de facto strong normative deductivist. If 
human psychology is such that the only arguments we make are deductively valid, then 
the normative standard of inferential adequacy would have to be deductive validity; 
anything less just wouldn’t be an argument. It is worth stating again that strong 
psychological deductivism seems implausible, because people often argue in ways that 
are intentionally deductively invalid; they produce arguments which they are aware are 
deductively invalid.
Weak psychological justifications might also justify strong normative 
deductivism. If all arguers have beliefs and intentions that make their arguments attempts 
at deductively valid inferences, then we might dismiss attempts which fall short.
Attempts to make deductively valid arguments that do not make actual deductively valid 
arguments might be understood as failures—as attempts which did not succeed.
The strong normative deductivist might invoke such considerations to support the 
view that the only arguments that should be accepted as logically good are arguments that
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realize their aim—which for the psychological deductivist is deductive validity—hence, 
deductively invalid arguments should be dismissed. Here we have a strong normative 
deductivism justified by the psychological claim that all arguers are attempting to make 
deductively valid arguments. We dismiss any arguments that are not deductively valid 
(strong normative deductivist) because that suggests that the arguer failed to accomplish 
her aim (psychological deductivism).
The next justification that I will explain is the normative justification for 
reconstructive deductivism. Arguments that are not deductively valid, under this 
justification, should be turned into logically good arguments that are deductively valid 
because deductively valid arguments are the best version of any argument. If we adopt a 
normative deductivism, then instead of dismissing arguments that are not deductively 
valid, we would turn them into deductively valid arguments. The normative deductivist 
might invoke charity and reconstruct an argument that is not deductively valid into a 
deductively valid argument and then proceed to evaluate the argument’s premises.
Instead of dismissing the argument they might think that a reconstructive process 
advances rational discussion—so while the original argument is no good, it should be 
turned into a different, yet similar, logically good argument for evaluation. I think 
Godden (2005) makes this point clearly. Godden distinguishes between deductivism as a 
normative, or according to his terminology an evaluative thesis, and deductivism as a 
reconstructive or, as he terms it, an interpretive thesis, and makes the point that “if [the 
evaluative] thesis were true—that is, if the only acceptable standard of evidence was 
embodied in the rules of deduction—then [the interpretive thesis] would follow as a 
consequence” (Godden 2005: p. 170).
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Pragmatic justifications for deductivism only apply to reconstructive 
deductivism. Generally these justifications assert that reconstructing arguments as 
deductively valid is useful for analyzing and evaluating the argument. Whether all 
arguments are deductive entities, or humans are psychologically constituted so that they 
attempt to make deductive arguments, or whether deductive arguments are better than 
others, is irrelevant. Pragmatic justifications claim that there is heuristic value in 
deductively reconstructing arguments that are not deductive for the purpose of evaluation 
regardless of whether deductive validity is the best standard, or whether or not people 
always attempt to argue deductively. By turning the argument into a deductively valid 
argument we need only evaluate the premises of the deductively valid version of the 
argument. This is a useful strategy for critiquing or defending an argument, or so, at 
least, claims the pragmatist about reconstructive deductivism.
Pragmatic justifications for reconstructive deductivism are consistent with there 
being a plurality of different sorts of inferential links between premises and conclusions. 
There may be many different types of deductively invalid premises-conclusion 
relationships. The pragmatic justification only claims that these relationships can be 
evaluated as deductively valid arguments through the addition of a premise that expresses 
an argument’s inferential link and the subsequent assessment of that premise’s 
acceptability. We might here distinguish between a weak and a strong version of the 
pragmatic justification for reconstructive deductivism. The strong version of would insist 
that the reconstructive strategy is the most useful of any strategy for evaluating 
arguments. The weak version, on the other hand, says it is as useful as any other method 
for the evaluation of arguments.
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The strong version claims that reconstructing arguments as deductively valid is 
the best way to evaluate arguments. There is no better way to logically evaluate 
arguments than to turn them into deductively valid arguments. Evaluating arguments 
according to some other method such as the fallacy approach, inductivism (positivism), 
or conductivism, etc. is possible, but these alternative methods are not as effective for the 
evaluation of inferential adequacy as reconstructive deductivism.
The weak pragmatic justification does not claim that reconstructing arguments as 
deductively valid is any better than some other method of evaluation. It only suggests 
that it is as useful as any other method for evaluating arguments. This line of justification 
for reconstructive deductivism might then invoke Ockham’s razor and claim that instead 
of using a plurality of different standards for argument evaluation we should use just one, 
and since deductive validity is a well understood standard, and a simple method of 
evaluating inferential adequacy that can be applied to all arguments, we should adopt it as 
a convention.
1.5 Conclusion
We have looked at two broad categories of deductivism—normative deductivism 
and reconstructive deductivism. We saw that normative deductivism divides into a weak 
and a strong version. We then looked at some potential ways of trying to justify 
deductivism. We looked at ontological and psychological justificatory strategies for 
normative deductivism. For reconstructive deductivism we presented ontological, 
psychological, normative, and pragmatic justificatory strategies. This list does not claim 
comprehensiveness.
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This sketch of the different types of deductivism and their corresponding potential 
justificatory strategies has the aim of refining our understanding of what deductivism is 
and why someone might want to be a deductivist. Its aim is not to defend deductivism. 
Rather, its aim is to clarify the dialectic surrounding deductivism. I think looking at the 
issue of deductivism according to the conceptual terrain sketched in this thesis helps to 
clarify the possibilities of deductivism for all sides of the issue. Proponents of 
deductivism could decide what justifications they think best support their version of 
deductivism and solidify them. Opponents could systematically critique each potential 
justification.
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In the first chapter I sketched the conceptual terrain of different deductivist 
theories of inferential adequacy. In that chapter I gave definitions for three different 
kinds of deductivism and examined some of the different justificatory strategies that can 
be used to support these varieties of deductivism. In this chapter I provide an account of 
reconstructive deductivism. This account will focus on reconstructive deductivism as it 
has been developed within the informal logic and argumentation theory literature. In the 
following chapter I examine criticisms that have emerged within the informal logic and 
argumentation theory scholarly communities, and in the final chapter I will develop some 
of my own criticisms and evaluate the viability of weak and strong normative 
deductivism.
2.2 Introduction
Formal deductive logic (FDL) is a powerful system for logically evaluating 
certain arguments. It offers logicians a precise set of rules for determining the validity of 
inferences. However, FDL runs into problems modeling arguments used outside formal 
contexts. In Govier (1987, 1999) and Johnson (2000) this problem has offered the 
foundations for a critique of FDL as a method of evaluating arguments. But other 
informal logicians and argumentation theorists, such as Leo Groarke (1992, 1995, 1999,
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2002), Susan Geritsen (1994), and Louis Groarke (2000), have argued that a variation on 
FDL is the best way to assess natural language arguments. In this chapter I plan to 
provide a descriptive account of reconstructive deductivism as it has been developed 
within the informal logic tradition. In particular, following Godden, I will take the work 
of Leo Groarke to be representative “of the kinds of arguments that could be developed in 
defense of reconstructive deductivism” (Godden 2005: p. 168).
I begin this chapter with a general account of the informal logic movement and 
how the version of deductivism developed by Leo and Louis Groarke, as well as Susan 
Gerritsen, fits in with this movement. I continue with a detailed exposition of my 
understanding of Leo Groarke’s brand of reconstructive deductivism. I also discuss the 
different strategies that Groarke employs in an effort to justify reconstructive 
deductivism. I conclude that Leo Groarke can be interpreted as using psychological, 
normative, and pragmatic justificatory strategies.
2.3 Formalism, Informal Logic, and Deductivism
The informal logician “sets out to study arguments from a point of view that is 
different from. . .formal logicians” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans: 1996, p. 
163). In the 1970s, across Canada and the United States, several logic teachers became 
dissatisfied with teaching formal techniques for the purpose of evaluating and analyzing 
natural language arguments. While formal logic offers well-defined procedures to 
determine logical relationships—such as, in truth-functional logic: equivalence, 
consistency, and validity—it proved difficult to apply meaningful formal analyses and
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evaluation to arguments in the real world. A typical reaction that teachers of logic would 
receive from students exposed to formal techniques would be: “How does understanding 
logical entailment or equivalence help me evaluate reasons for or against Quebec 
separating from Canada or the reason for or against the impeachment of Richard Nixon?” 
It seemed to some logic teachers in the 1970’s that the tools of analysis and evaluation 
developed in formal logic were helpful for arguments abstracted from real world 
contexts, but not for arguments that are found in boardroom meetings, political debates, 
or legal cases. In an introduction to one of the early informal logic textbooks, its author, 
Howard Kahane, explains his motivation for writing the text in the following way:
Today’s students demand a marriage of theory and practice. That is why 
so many of them judge introductory courses on logic. . .  not relevant to 
their interests.
In a class . . .  I was going over the (to me) fascinating intricacies of 
the predicate logic quantifier rules, a student asked in disgust how anything 
he’d learned all semester long had any bearing whatever on President 
Johnson’s decision to escalate again in Vietnam. I mumbled something 
about bad logic on Johnson’s part, and then stated that Introduction to 
Logic was not that kind of course. His reply was to ask what courses did 
take up such matters, and I had to admit that so far as I knew none did.
He wanted what most students today want, a course relevant to 
everyday reasoning, a course relevant to the arguments they hear and read 
about race, pollution, poverty, sex, atomic warfare, the population
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explosion, and all other problems faced by the human race. (Kahane 1976:
Kahane 1971: p. vii)
The counter-culture zeitgiest of the 1960’s molded informal logic as a reaction to the 
perceived difficulties that formal logic had in evaluating everyday, real-world, practical 
arguments (Johnson and Blair 1997 pp. 158 and 165-166). Certainly, the techniques of 
formal logic can say with absolute certainty if some sentences entail others sentences, but 
these formal techniques, so the early informal logicians thought, do not tell us enough 
about whether an argument is good. Here is an example:
1. If Ottawa is the capital of Canada, then British Columbia is on the Pacific 
Coast.
2. Ottawa is the capital of Canada.
3. Therefore, British Columbia is on the Pacific Coast.
As I shall show this argument is not good. However, according to formal logic, this 
argument is sound because it “has two essential features: It is valid and all its premises 
are true” (Layman 2002: p. 6). In formal logic, arguments do not get any better than 
that—they can’t meet any higher evaluative standard. But there are other logical 
characteristics of the above argument that indicate that it is not a good argument. We 
want to know, for instance, if the argument’s premises are acceptable, and if they offer 
relevant and sufficient support for their conclusion. The first premise is clearly not an
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acceptable premise because the antecedent, ‘Ottawa is the capital of Canada,’ is not a 
relevant reason to think that ‘BC is on the Pacific coast.’
Rolf George and Nina Gandhi (2005) point out some of the differences between 
the formal and informal approach to logical analysis and pedagogy. Instead of exposing 
the mind to the rigors of the formal approach to drawing and assessing implications,
Informal logic texts . . .  do not focus . . .  on [training] the mind through 
exposure to formalism, but charge directly into maneuvers, simulations of 
battle that are close to the real thing, and discuss issues of present and 
important concern (George and Gandhi 2005: p. 121).
Through this approach to the study and teaching of logic, the informal logician aims to 
develop concepts for the purpose of logical evaluation that are broader in scope than 
formal techniques of logical entailment and truth.
Relevance, sufficiency, and premise acceptability are examples of logical 
concepts used by a number of informal logicians to broaden the scope of argument 
evaluation. In the textbook Logical Self-Defense first published in 1977 Johnson and 
Blair developed relevance, sufficiency and acceptability as “criteria that govern logically 
good argumentation.” They define the different criteria of the “RSA triangle” (Johnson 
and Blair, 2006: p. 55) as follows:
Relevance: One of the three criteria that govern logically good 
argumentation; each premise of the argument must be relevant to the
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conclusion. The determination of relevance must be made taking into 
consideration every other premise of the argument (Johnson and Blair 
2006 p. 304).
Sufficiency. One of the three criteria that govern logically good 
argumentation; taken all together, the premises must provide enough 
evidence or adequate reason to warrant accepting the conclusion (Johnson 
air 2006).
Acceptability. The quality of being acceptable; a premise is acceptable 
hen it is reasonable to expect a member of the audience to take the 
pi v ;e without further support; one of the three criteria that govern 
logically good argumentation; each premise must satisfy this requirement 
(Johnson and Blair 2006: p. 297).
I do not mean to suggest that there is unanimous agreement within the informal logic 
literature that the RSA conditions are necessary and sufficient concepts for logical 
evaluation. There has been much discussion as to whether or not they satisfy such 
conditions (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans et al 1996: p. 178-180). For my 
purposes, therefore, I adopt these definitions of the RSA conditions as good working 
definitions without committing myself to whether or not they are necessary and sufficient 
concepts for logical evaluation. These concepts introduce broad normative criteria that 
can be applied to natural language arguments for the purposes of evaluation. They have 
also been incorporated with “varying terminology, in Govier (1985), Darner (1987),
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Little, Groarke and Tindale (1989), and Seech (1993)” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
Henkemans et al 1996: 178).
A standard definition of argument in formal logic is “a set of sentences one of 
which (the conclusion) is taken to be supported by the remaining sentences (the 
premises)” (Bergmann, Moore, and Nelson 1998: p. 7). While informal logicians have 
debated the definition of argument, something roughly like the above is adequate as at 
least part o f the definition for them as well. What informal logicians seek to include in 
their conception of argument that makes it more comprehensive than the standard formal 
conception of argument is a broader notion of what the term ‘support’ amounts to. For 
instance, Johnson’s notion of a good argument includes an ‘illative core,’ which is 
roughly similar to the standard formal definition of argument, as well a ‘dialectical tier’ 
where the arguer speaks to objections raised about their argument (Johnson 2000: p. 168).
Formal logicians, on the one hand, are primarily interested in the sort of support 
provided by premises that entail their conclusion—with a secondary concern for truth, 
which, from the formal logician’s standpoint, is to be ultimately settled by the experts in 
the field about which the premise makes the claim. On the other hand, the informal 
standards for argument goodness, according to some informal logicians, are not 
dependent on whether the premises of an argument entail its conclusion. Informal 
logicians are concerned with whether an argument satisfies a set of broad normative 
criteria such as the RSA conditions. The determination of inferential adequacy, for 
certain informal logicians, does not depend on whether the conclusion is entailed by the 
premises. According to these informal logicians, validity is just not an essential 
characteristic of logical goodness. For them an argument can satisfy some other standard
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of inferential adequacy which provides sufficient support for the conclusion without 
entailing it. Some alternative evaluative standards might be abductive or conductive 
standards for inferential adequacy.
This view does not imply that validity is not a real characteristic of some 
arguments. It only suggests that validity is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
inferential adequacy. Arguments can be good and fail to entail their conclusion or they 
can be bad and entail their conclusion (for instance the above example about Ottawa and 
B.C.). Johnson and Blair’s RSA conditions are evaluative concepts that are not 
dependent on whether a conclusion is entailed by its premises. An argument can be good 
if it satisfies these standards and does not entail its conclusion. An argument, however, 
cannot be good without meeting the RSA standards even when the argument’s premises 
entail its conclusion. In this way the RSA conditions broaden the notion of logical 
support beyond the criteria of truth and validity.
But this is not the whole story. While informal logicians have sought to broaden 
the concept of logical analysis beyond entailment, there are many informal logicians who 
have also insisted that entailment has an important role in logical evaluation.
This group of informal logicians can be divided into two camps. On the one 
hand, there are those who would view entailment as one amongst other standards of 
inferential adequacy. For instance, what I understand Govier to mean by ‘‘thepluralist 
view” (Govier 1999; p. 108) can be thought of as fitting into this camp; also, what I call 
in chapter one “weak normative deductivism’'’ fits in here. These views see entailment as 
one standard of inferential adequacy among others. Entailment would play some role, 
according to those who recognize other standards of inferential adequacy than deductive
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validity, in the logical evaluation of only some arguments. On the other hand, other 
informal logicians have conceived of entailment as having a role in evaluating all 
arguments. Deductivism has usually been thought of as an elaboration of the latter view, 
although, as we saw in chapter one there is a version of deductivism—weak normative 
deductivism—which would more appropriately fit in with the former view. The 
informal logicians and argumentation theorists who see entailment has having a central 
role in evaluating all arguments—that is, those who fit in with the latter camp—have 
developed and advanced reconstructive deductivism.
Defenses of deductivism, and subsequent further developments of deductivist 
theories of argument, have emerged as a reaction to criticisms of deductivism developed 
by Stove (1970) and Govier (1987). Among the defenders of deductivism in the informal 
logic and argumentation theory literature, as previously mentioned, are Leo Groarke 
(1992, 1995, 1999, 2002) Susan Gerritsen (1994) and Louis Groarke (2000).
2.4 Leo Groarke’s Deductivism
The first thing to point out about Groarke’s deductivism is that it is a version of 
what Govier (1987: p. 230) calls nonformal deductivism. Groarke calls this type of 
deductivism natural language deductivism, or NLD for short (Groarke 1999: p. 1). The 
formal logician sees entailment solely as a matter of argument form. “That is, the 
premises would have to entail the conclusion, and the entailment relationship would have 
to hold in virtue of the structure of the argument, as based on standardly logical words 
such as ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘none’, ‘not’, ‘if then’, ‘or’, and so on” (Govier 1987: p. 23).
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Nonformal (or natural language) deductivists in contrast, admit that arguments can be 
“deductively valid in virtue of either meaning or form” (Govier 1987: p. 23). NLD has a 
more flexible view then FDL about what arguments are to be classified as deductively 
valid arguments. For the formalist the following argument is not valid:
1. The garbage is always picked up at least once a week.
2. The garbage has not been picked up for the last six days.
3. Therefore, the garbage will be picked up tomorrow.
This argument is not valid in virtue of its form because it does not make explicit a 
premise with the content ‘if the garbage is always picked up once a week and it has not 
been picked up for six days, then it will be picked up tomorrow.’ Without the addition of 
such a premise, the argument is not deductively valid because of its form. We cannot 
abstract the argument into a logically valid argument form, like modus ponens. But a 
nonformal deductivist recognizes that because of “the meaning of nonlogical terms in the 
argument” (Godden 2005: p. 169), if the argument’s premises are true, then the 
conclusion must be true too. Because “a week” means “an interval of seven days,” and 
“the garbage is always picked up, at least, once a week”—thus, it is picked up at least 
once for every seven day interval—and given that the garbage has not been picked up for 
the last six days and making tomorrow the seventh day, it logically follows that the 
garbage will be picked up tomorrow. This entailment, however, is based on the meaning 
of the words ‘week,’ ‘day,’ and ‘tomorrow,’ not on the logical form of the argument.
Still: it is not possible for the premises of the above argument to be true while the
- 27-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conclusion is false. If we say (1) is false then it could be possible that the garbage will 
not be picked up tomorrow. The same holds if we assert that (2) is false or that both (1) 
and (2) are false. But if we say that (1) and (2) are true, then we must also say of (3) that 
it is true. Entailments, like the one in the above argument, which are based on the 
meaning of the argument’s nonlogical terms, can be called semantic entailments.
There are two key features of NLD that Groarke identifies as distinguishing it 
from FDL. “First, [NLD] replaces a technically defined sense of validity with a non­
formalized sense of validity. Second, [NLD] does not propose soundness as a sufficient 
criterion for distinguishing good and bad arguments” (Groarke 2002: p. 278). NLD, 
rather than understanding formal validity as the only sort of validity, will also include 
semantic entailments. NLD can be understood, therefore, as being a type of what Govier 
called nonformal deductivism. The standard of deductive validity, as it is understood in 
NLD, may not properly “be equated with formal validity” because “material validity will 
do just nicely” (Godden 2005: p. 171).
The second feature that distinguishes NLD from formal logic is that, unlike in 
formal logic, truth is not a necessary criterion for goodness of argument, according to 
NLD. The natural language deductivist admits to the class of good arguments, not only 
arguments with true premises, but also arguments with acceptable premises. “A premise 
is acceptable,” as we saw Johnson and Blair claim, “when it is reasonable to expect a 
member of the audience to take the premise without further support” (Johnson and Blair 
2006: p. 297). A premise that an audience is reasonably expected to be justified in 
believing based on evidence it has or evidence it is reasonably expected to have is an 
acceptable premise. The justification for an acceptable statement could prove its truth
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conclusively, but it need not. The justification could also provide probable or plausible 
support for the claim-—that is to say, it might not prove that the claim is true, but 
establish some reason to think that it is true. NLD is then able to include in the class of 
good arguments those with acceptable premise whose truth we have not made—or cannot 
make—conclusive judgments about.
It is desirable to include these arguments because often we do not know whether 
an argument’s premises are true but, nevertheless, because the premises are still 
acceptable, the argument is reasonable. There have been many philosophical, moral, and 
scientific arguments that have supported their conclusions well but have turned out to 
have false premises. We do not want to say that these are not cogent arguments because 
their premises turned out to be false. NLD can distinguish between cogent arguments 
that give good reason for their conclusion and arguments that do not provide good 
reasons for their conclusion because they are not cogent. We do not want to dismiss an 
argument only on the grounds that it has turned out not to have true premises. NLD, 
accordingly, admits arguments with acceptable premises and undetermined truth status as 
cogent arguments. We want to recognize that the cogent arguments began with 
acceptable premises and proceeded to justify its conclusion on the grounds of those 
premises even if those arguments may turn out to be false.
Some examples of acceptable premises with truth values that we have not made or 
cannot make conclusive judgments about might be probabilistic claims and plausible 
normative claims with equally plausible defeater normative claims (so we cannot tell 
which one is true). As an example of the latter consider the normative claims: ‘we should 
impose strict regulations on fossil fuel emitting industry’ and ‘we should not impose
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strict regulations on fossil fuel emitting industry.’ Both statements are reasonable, and 
both might have some justification in their favor, but both statements cannot be true at the 
same time. Therefore, we are justified in believing the claims made in either argument 
even though we cannot think they are both true simultaneously.
Non-normative claims whose truth we can question or about which we are not 
able to make conclusive judgments can also be acceptable. An example of an argument 
with the latter type of claim would be the following:
1. A person with plugged sinuses, a cough, and a fever, has a cold.
2. Jack has plugged sinuses, a cough and a fever.
3. Therefore Jack has a cold.
While the above argument has acceptable premises, the premises need not be true.
There could be other reasons for Jack’s symptoms. Allergies, for instance, might be a 
good candidate. People with allergies can have the list of symptoms in (1) but not 
necessarily because they have a cold. Therefore, the statement that anyone who has the 
symptoms in (1) has a cold is not true but, nevertheless, seems acceptable. We have 
justification to think that someone who has those symptoms has a cold, but this 
justification does not conclusively establish the truth of the statement: rather, it only 
provides reason to believe it.
Contrary, then, to FDL, arguments like the examples above can meet the standard 
of goodness laid out in NLD because NLD (i) admits arguments that are entailments based
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on the meaning of natural language sentences and (ii) weakens the criterion of premise 
truth to premise acceptability.
2.5 An Expository Description of NLD
Having highlighted the two specific ways that Groarke’s NLD differs from formal 
deductive logic, I will now present a positive description of NLD, and discuss some of its 
justifications. I think that Groarke uses three of the four justifications for reconstructive 
deductivism discussed in chapter one to support NLD. But before I get into a discussion 
of Groarke’s justifications, a description of how Groarke would apply NLD in argument 
evaluation is needed.
Groarke claims that reconstructive deductivism should be applied to any 
argument. He even thinks that inductive arguments ought to be reconstructed as 
deductively valid. Groarke asserts that “we can treat all arguments as deductive” 
(Groarke 1999: p. 14), including what he terms, “so called inductive arguments’ (Groarke 
2002: p. 281). Louis Groarke, picking up on his brother’s point in an article titled ‘A 
Deductive Account of Induction’ suggests that “inductive arguments are in a proper 
technical sense, deductively valid and that their conclusions are entailed by their 
premises” (Groarke 2000: p. 354). For Leo Groarke, then, a classical inductive argument 
like
1. Every swan I have thus far observed is white.
2. Therefore, all swans are white.
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can be reconstructed as deductively valid because the arguer, according to Groarke, may 
be understood as committed to a premise like ‘the swans I have observed thus far are a 
representative sample of swans’. Another example of a deductivist reconstruction of 
arguments that are typically treated as non-deductive is the following:
‘Howl’ is superficial and dated. ‘The Second Coming’ has 
profound social significance. Therefore, ‘The Second Coming’ is 
a finer poem than ‘Howl’ (Groarke 1999: p. 7).
This argument, according to Groarke, which is an example he adopts from Conway and 
Munson’s description of non-deductive arguments, can be reconstructed as deductively 
valid through the addition of an implicit premise. The argument would then be 
reconstructed in the following manner:
‘Howl’ is superficial and dated. ‘The Second Coming’ has 
profound social significance. A poem which has profound social 
significance is a finer poem that one which is superficial and 
dated. Therefore, ‘The Second Coming’ is a finer poem than 
‘Howl’ (Groarke 1999: p. 8).
An arguer advancing an argument like the one above might respond to the criticism that 
“a poem which is superficial has technical merits that make it superior to one which has
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profound social significance” by restating the “conclusion as the claim that ‘The Second 
Coming’ is probably better than ‘Howl’” and the implicit premise as the claim that, “‘A 
poem which has profound social significance is probably a finer poem than one which is 
superficial and dated’” (Groarke 1999: p. 8).
Groarke thinks a reconstructive deductivist strategy like the one just illustrated 
can be applied to all arguments. Through adding appropriate modal qualifiers and 
implicit premises we can turn any argument, so thinks Groarke, into a deductive 
argument. We can then evaluate the argument by assessing the acceptability of the 
premises of the reconstructed argument. Gerritsen describes this reconstructive 
deductivist strategy as follows:
The distinction between deductive and inductive arguments mainly 
concerns a difference in the degree of certainty of the inference 
from the premises to the conclusion. It is possible to incorporate 
this degree of certainty in the analysis without abandoning the 
deductive framework. This can be achieved by adding specific 
semantic indicators of the strength of the inference (‘It is likely 
th a t. . .’, ‘I feel it is certainly so th a t. . .’) to either the premises or 
the conclusion if  such indicator words are absent from the original.
(Gerritsen 2002: p. 57)
Here are a few other examples of this approach to argument reconstruction that Groarke 
takes from Conway and Munson’s (1997: p. 40-47) description of non-deductive
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arguments. Groarke thinks all of these can be reconstructed as deductively valid 
arguments:
1. Ninety-six percent of adult Americans watch television more 
than ten hours per week. Davis is an adult American.
Therefore, Davis watches television more than ten hours per 
week.
2. Every wolverine so far encountered by humans has been 
unfriendly and aggressive. Therefore, all wolverines are 
unfriendly and aggressive.
3. Congressman Smith would be an excellent senator because he 
was bom on Independence Day.
Groarke reconstmcts these arguments as deductively valid by adding the following 
premises:
1*. Davis is among the ninety-six percent.
2*. All wolverines are like the ones so far encountered by humans.
3*. Someone born on Independence Day would make an excellent 
senator.
Arguments (1), (2), and (3), respectively, are evaluated by assessing the acceptability of 
the premises (1) and 1*, the premises (2) and 2*, and the premises (3) and 3*. Groarke
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thinks examples like these illustrate how all arguments can be evaluated by 
reconstructing them as deductively valid, even arguments that have traditionally been 
treated as irreducibly non-deductive.
2.6 Groarke’s Justifications for Reconstructive Deductivism
For the time being, I want to set aside questions about whether Groarke’s version 
of reconstructive deductivism can be applied to evaluate all arguments. I think there are 
some problems with such a claim. I propose, however, to forego discussing these 
problems until the next two chapters, where I will cover some criticisms of reconstructive 
deductivism. For the present, I want to examine the reasons that Groarke uses to provide 
a justification for reconstructive deductivism. Because all arguments, according to 
Groarke, can be reconstructed as deductively valid, it does not follow that all arguments 
should be reconstructed as deductively valid. Groarke must provide reasons for why we 
should reconstruct arguments as deductively valid.
In the last chapter, I presented four different justificatory strategies for 
reconstructive deductivism: ontological, psychological, normative, and pragmatic. Part 
of the reason why Groarke’s NLD is a good representative of reconstructive deductivism 
is that Groarke uses three of the above four possible justificatory strategies to justify 
reconstructive deductivism. Groarke, on my understanding, uses weak psychological, 
strong normative, and pragmatic, justificatory strategies.
Groarke’s weak psychological justification for reconstructive deductivism is 
based on a conceptual analysis of the speech acts involved in ‘making an argument.’ He
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connects this justification for reconstructive deductivism with the pragma-dialectical 
(1992) analysis of argumentation (Groarke 1999: p. 6).
The pragma-dialectical school of argumentation theory has developed a method 
for evaluating critical discussions aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. The two 
founders of pragma-dialectics were Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. 
Pragma-dialecticians incorporate both normative and descriptive components into their 
theory of argumentation. The importance of a theory that integrates both the normative 
standards involved in critical discussions, with an empirical description of the actual 
speech acts that are used during critical discussion, is defended in the following passage:
Scholars of argumentation are interested in how argumentative 
discourse can be used to justify or refute a standpoint in a rational 
way. In our opinion, argumentative discourse should therefore be 
studied as a specimen of normal verbal communication and 
interaction and it should, at the same time, be measured against a 
certain standard of reasonableness. If pragmatics is taken to be the 
study of language use, the need for this convergence of normative 
idealization and empirical description can be acknowledged by 
construing the study of argumentation as part of ‘normative 
pragmatics’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: p. 5).
In Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (1992), van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
postulate a normative idealization of argumentative discourse which consists of a series
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of different types of speech acts—such as assertives, commisives, directives, and usage 
declaratives—preformed at different stages of an argumentative exchange—such as the 
opening stage, the confrontation stage, the concluding stage, and the argumentation stage. 
Speech acts can be distinguished as elementary and complex speech acts. Elementary 
speech acts are made at the sentence level. They are individual expressions. A complex 
speech act is a complex of several speech acts some of which may be implicit in what a 
speaker ostensively says. An argument, for instance, can be considered a complex speech 
act. Another example of such a speech act might be an explanation. Pragma-dialectics 
offers normative standards for argumentative exchanges and ways of characterizing the 
use of speech acts in such exchanges. Pragma-dialecticians analyze an argumentative 
discourse by determining what speech acts the interlocutors in the exchange use at the 
various stages of argumentation and then make judgments about that discourse by 
determining to what extent it follows the normative idealization of argumentative 
discourse.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) laid out conditions for identifying a 
speech act complex as an argument. That is to say, if we are able to understand a speaker 
as advancing an argumentation for a standpoint she desires to defend (or against a 
standpoint she intends to criticize), then she must make utterances that satisfy certain 
“identity’’ and “correctness” conditions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s 1992: p. 30). 
For a complex speech act to be considered an argument, it must meet two identity 
conditions, “if these conditions have not been fulfilled, it is not possible for the listener to 
decide whether he is dealing with a promise, a request or a statement and what it entails” 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: p. 30). With respect to some propositionp  that is
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endorsed by a speaker, a set of utterances 1, 2 , . . n can “be considered a performance of 
the complex speech act of argumentation, [when] two sorts of identity conditions have.. . 
[been] met:”
1. Propositional content condition: utterances 1, 2 , . . .  n 
constitute the elementary speech acts 1, 2 , . . .  , n, in which a 
commitment is undertaken to the propositions expressed.
2. Essential condition: the performance of the constellation of 
speech acts that consists of the elementary speech acts 1 , 2 , . . .
, n, counts as an attempt by the speaker to justify p, that is to 
convince the listener of the acceptability of his standpoint with 
respect to p. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: pp. 30-31)
If these conditions are not present in a speech act complex, then that speech act complex 
cannot be considered a performance of argumentation. In addition to the identity 
conditions, there are also two correctness conditions that “must be fulfilled for the 
utterance concerned to be an appropriate performance” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
1992: p. 30) of speech act argumentation. Having satisfied the identity conditions, there 
are several ways that a speaker can fail to meet the correctness conditions of the speech 
act complex of argumentation. The following are the correctness conditions that must be 
met for a speaker to correctly engage in the complex speech act of argumentation:
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1. Preparatory Conditions'.
a. The speaker believes that the listener does not accept 
(or at least not automatically or wholly accept) his 
standpoint with respect to p.
b. The speaker believes that the listener is prepared to 
accept the constellation of elementary speech acts in 1,
2 ■ • •, n.
c. The speaker believes that the listener is prepared to 
accept the constellation of elementary speech acts 1,2, .
. . . ,  n as an acceptable justification of p.
2. Responsibility Conditions:
a. The speaker believes that his standpoint with respect to 
p  is acceptable.
b. The speaker believes that the propositions expressed in 
the elementary speech acts 1, 2 ,. . . ,  n are acceptable.
c. The speaker believes that the constellation of the 
elementary speech acts 1, 2 , . . . ,  n is an acceptable 
justification, (van Eemeren and Grootendorst: p. 31)
Groarke adopts an interpretation of these analytic conditions for the very act of making 
an argument that he thinks justifies a reconstructive deductivist strategy. He argues, 
based on a conceptual analysis of the speech act ‘argument’, that we can ascribe beliefs to 
any arguer which warrant a deductive reconstruction of their argument. Groarke says:
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We can see that it is always possible to deductively reconstruct an 
argument which is not transparently deductive by noting that any 
arguer is committed to the statement ‘If the premises of my 
argument are true then the conclusion is true’. This follows 
directly from the implications of the speech acts ‘argument’ and 
‘assertion’, for any arguer who argues for some conclusion C on 
the basis of some set of premises purports to believe that C is true 
and the her premises justify this belief, (cf. van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst: 1992 pp. 30-31) In this sense, their argument 
declares that they believe that these premises imply the conclusion 
and that the conclusion is true if the premise are true. It is perhaps 
worth noting that they are committed to the latter conditional not 
merely in the sense of material implication, but in the stronger 
sense that they must believe there is a relationship between their 
premises and their conclusion which makes it reasonable to base a 
belief in the latter on a belief in the former. (Groarke: 1999 pp. 6- 
7 bold added)
In this quotation I understand Groarke to be employing both a weak psychological 
justification as well as a normative justification for reconstructive deductivism. I will 
first explain Groarke’s use of the weak psychological justification, and then I will discuss 
his use of the normative justification.
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Part of what Groarke is claiming in the above quotation is that one consequence 
of the correctness and identity conditions for ‘making an argument’ is that the interpreters 
of arguments are justified in reconstructing any argument as deductively valid. If an 
interpreter fails to recognize that an argument may be reconstructed as deductively valid, 
then the interpreter has failed to capture an arguer’s commitments and beliefs relevant to 
the argument. The interpreter, claims Groarke, would have failed to supply the beliefs 
that are needed for the conclusion to be justified by the premises. Groarke has good 
reason to think that this is a consequence of the correctness and identity conditions of the 
complex speech act ‘argument’. In fact, van Eemeren and Grootendorst take this to be 
one consequence of the identity and correctness conditions:
If the speaker is sincere and does not believe that his 
argumentation is futile, this also means that he assumes the listener 
will include the criterion of logical validity: because of the 
responsibility condition the speaker may be assumed to believe 
that the argument underlying his argumentation is valid, and 
because of the preparatory condition he may be assumed to believe 
that the listener will believe this too. (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1992: p. 62)
It is in this sense that Groarke advocates the view that “all arguments should be 
understood as attempts at deductive arguments” (Groarke 1999: p.l). We can understand 
all arguments as deductively valid because underlying every argument—as a condition of
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its being an argument—the arguer must be attributed beliefs which allow the argument to 
be understood as an attempt at a deductively valid argument. Hence, according to 
Groarke, an evaluator of arguments is always warranted in reconstructing arguments so 
that they are deductively valid. Failure to so understand arguments as deductively valid, 
thinks Groarke, would be tantamount to the evaluator of the argument failing to recognize 
that “any arguer who argues for some conclusion C on the basis of some set purports to 
believe that C is true and that her premises justify this belief’ (Groarke 1999: p. 6). For if 
the evaluator recognized this relationship which the arguer purports to hold between her 
premises and her conclusion, then the evaluator would also recognize that the arguer is 
committed to the truth of the claim that ‘if the premises of my argument are true, then the 
conclusion is true.’ Given this belief we can always, at minimum, add the argument’s 
associated conditional (a hypothetical conditional statement with the given premises as 
antecedent and the conclusion as consequent) and give the argument the deductively valid 
argument form— modus ponens. Adding this conditional, thinks Groarke, is always 
consistent with an arguer’s beliefs and commitments. If we do not think that we can add 
this conditional to an argument, then the purported argument must not have satisfied—in 
our minds at least—a necessary condition of being an argument. Its arguer must not have 
believed that her argument’s premises justify her conclusion; or, in other words, that her 
conclusion follows from her premises. Therefore, asserts Groarke, as a very condition of 
making an argument an arguer must adopt a stance towards her argument that warrants an 
interpreter in reconstructing that argument as deductively valid.
I understand Groarke to be, in part, making a claim about an arguer’s beliefs 
based on a conceptual analysis of the speech acts ‘argument’ and ‘assertion’. Groarke’s
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conceptual analysis of argument leads to consequences for what arguers must believe in 
order to be understood to be making an argument. Based on this (psychological) claim 
we have, according to Groarke, a reason to reconstruct arguments as deductively valid.
Groarke’s version of the psychological justification for reconstructive 
deductivism explicitly disavows that arguers have any special intention about how their 
conclusion follows from their premises. Groarke makes clear that “ordinary reasoners do 
not distinguish the kinds of argument and persuasion which argumentation theory 
proposes as fundamentally different kinds of argument” (Groarke 1999b: p. 36). This 
quotation draws a distinction between arguments, and how arguments are understood and 
evaluated by argumentation theorists. Argumentation theorists do not aim to assess the 
intentions of arguers but to classify and evaluate arguments. Groarke’s version of 
deductivism understands all arguments to be deductive regardless, of what intention the 
arguer had when making the argument.
Now one justification that Groarke adopts to understand arguments such that they 
are deductively valid is Groarke’s conceptual analysis of ‘argument’ and ‘assertion’.
This analysis attributes beliefs to arguers that allow for a deductive reconstruction of any 
argument they make. I consider it a psychological justification of reconstructive 
deductivism because it is based on the arguer’s beliefs. It should be recognized that this 
justification does not rely on a special interpretation of the arguer’s intentions it only 
relies on the arguer having a commitment to certain beliefs that allow for a deductive 
reconstruction of her arguments.
Some critics of deductivism have also described this version of the psychological 
justification as a possible defense for reconstructive deductivism. In critiquing
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reconstructive deductivism, Govier describes a version of what I take to be the 
psychological justification.
If a person argues for a conclusion, C, then provided he or she is 
arguing sincerely, he or she believes C to be true. If that person 
believes C to be true, then he or she must believe a set of claims 
which entails C. Thus, if the arguer’s stated premises do not entail 
C, it is appropriate to supplement them to the point where they do 
entail C (Govier 1987: p. 89)
Because every arguer, according to this version of psychological deductivism, has beliefs 
that justify a reconstruction of the argument such that the premises entail the conclusion, 
every argument that does not entail its conclusion textually—that is, in its original form 
as a written or spoken piece of language—can be turned into a deductively valid 
argument without distorting what the arguer means. We can reconstruct the example “it’s 
snowing, so it’s cold,” in the following way:
1. If it’s snowing, then its cold.
2. It’s snowing.
3. Therefore, it’s cold.
Premise (1) is implicit. However, according to psychological deductivism, we can know 
that the arguer believes that “if (2) then (3).” The arguer, therefore, believes in the
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acceptability of a statement that would make the conclusion a necessary consequence of 
the premises and we are, thus, justified in reconstructing the argument as deductively 
valid.
The claim that every arguer believes in the truth of the associated conditional of 
their argument does not mean that simply adding the associated conditional is the best 
way to reconstruct the argument. It very well may be the case that in reconstructing an 
argument as deductively valid, it will be better to add some other premise that is not the 
associated conditional, but links the premise with the conclusion. In the earlier examples 
of Groarke’s reconstructions of deductively invalid arguments, Groarke did not simply 
add the associated conditional of the argument, but instead he added a premise that takes 
the form of a generalization which when added to the original argument makes it 
deductively valid. In an argument like the following,
1. Sheriton is a child.
2. Therefore, Sheriton is innocent.
we would not add the premise “if Sheriton is a child, then Sheriton is innocent.” Instead, 
to deductively reconstruct this argument, we would add the premise “Children are 
innocent.” The fact that arguers have a belief in the truth of their argument’s associated 
conditional only establishes that they adopt a stance in making an argument that warrants 
an interpreter to reconstruct their argument as deductively valid. Adding an argument’s 
associated conditional might not be the best way to interpret the argument. That the 
arguer believes in the truth of the associated conditional only warrants an interpreter to
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reconstruct the argument as deductively valid. Other premises might be less trivial and a 
more accurate reflection of the arguer’s intentions in making the argument. If there are 
other premises that are more likely to capture the arguer’s commitments, then it is these 
premises that should be added in reconstruction. Another example is the Socrates 
argument:
1. Socrates is a man.
2. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Practically no one would add this argument’s associated conditional if asked to supply its 
missing premise. Rather they would reconstruct this argument by adding the premise “all 
men are mortal.”
The other justificatory strategy represented in the quotation under discussion 
(page 40) is a normative justification for reconstructive deductivism. As we have seen, 
Groarke claims that every arguer must believe that their premises justify their conclusion. 
If the arguer does not think that their premises have provided justification for their 
conclusion, then the arguer cannot believe that their premises are reasons to endorse their 
conclusion. For Groarke because an arguer holds that their conclusion is justified by 
their premises they can be understood as having a commitment to the claim that, ‘if the 
premises of my argument are true then so is the conclusion’. That is to say, if a 
conclusion can be said to be justified by its premises, then the conclusion can be 
understood so that it is entailed by the premises. This follows from Groarke’s claim that 
an arguer “must believe that there is a relationship between their premises and their
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conclusion which makes it reasonable to base a belief in the latter on a belief in the 
former” (Groarke 1999: p. 6), where he thinks that what makes it “reasonable to base a 
belief’ in the conclusion on a belief in the premises is the claim that ‘if the premises of 
the argument are true then the conclusion is true.’ We can, therefore, understand every 
argument as deductively valid. Arguments that are not transparently deductively valid 
have implicit premises that can be added to the argument that make the argument 
transparently deductively valid.
We have seen two justifications for reconstructive deductivism used by Groarke. 
We have examined his justification for reconstructive deductivism on weak psychological 
grounds; that is, based on beliefs that must be attributed to any arguer. We have also 
examined his justificatory strategy from normative grounds; that is, based on a normative 
standard for premises to rationally support a conclusion. Groarke also takes 
reconstructive deductivism to be justified for pragmatic reasons. Groarke says:
It is one thing to show. . . [non-deductive arguments] can be 
understood as deductive arguments. It is another thing to show 
that this is a useful thing to do. (Groarke 1999: p. 8)
And:
The utility of deductivist argument reconstruction is highlighted by 
approaches to argument which are, like pragma-dialectics, 
dialectical and ‘resolution oriented.’ Such views underscore the 
point that we should develop theories of argument which can help 
identify the issues that need to be addressed in dialectical
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exchange. This is a goal which is well served by deductivist 
reconstruction, for the unexpressed premises it identifies often 
expose assumptions which need to be a focus of discussion when 
we decide whether an argument should be accepted. (Groarke 
1999: pp. 8-9)
Here Groarke is advancing the pragmatic usefulness of deductivism as a theory of 
argument evaluation. Through the reconstructive deductivist method of adding premises 
that make the argument deductively valid, Groarke claims that we will add premises that 
should be a focus of discussion. Through the addition of these unexpressed premises and 
their subsequent evaluations we are able to advance the dialectic of a critical discussion. 
This advancement of critical discussion about the claims made during an argument is 
useful because it will allow us to determine whether or not an argument is any good. We 
can, therefore, adopt reconstructive deductivism on the grounds that it is a useful way to 
evaluate arguments. Take any argument, add a valid-making premise to it, then assess 
the acceptability of the premises. The acceptability of the premises will correspond to the 
logical strength of the inference. For example, the argument,
1. Snakes can dance.
2, Therefore, Snakes are musical.
can be turned into a valid argument by adding the premise
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li. Anything that dances is musical.
The premise-conclusion link between (1) and (2) can then be evaluated by assessing the 
acceptability of (1) and (li). We might, generously, grant that (li) is an acceptable 
premise because dancing things usually require a sense of rhythm and, hence, may be 
thought of as musical (even if, potentially, in a very deficient sort of way). But it seems a 
stretch to claim that snakes are musical (even the swaying Indian Cobras are more 
attracted to the movement of the snake charmer than they are to the music coming from 
the flute) and so premise (1) is not acceptable. Therefore, based on this assessment of the 
reconstructed argument’s premises, the original invalid argument was not a good 
argument. Through using this reconstructive deductivist strategy we can usefully 
evaluate arguments. We can expose underlying assumptions, determine whether they are 
acceptable or not, and advance the critical discussion to move towards a rational 
resolution of the topic at hand.
Another useful reason for the adoption of reconstructive deductivism is that it is 
simpler to adopt one straightforward methodology for argument evaluation than to adopt 
many different standards for reconstructing and evaluating arguments. In considering the 
question of whether we should adopt a deductivist theory of argument or a theory, for 
instance, like what Groarke terms ‘inductivism’—which includes, in addition to methods 
for evaluating deductive arguments, methods for evaluating inductive arguments—the 
important factor that suggests we should adopt reconstructive deductivism . . .
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is that deductivism is favored by Ockham’s Razor, for it replaces 
two conceptions of inference with one and can in the process 
greatly simplify our account of natural language argument. Given 
that we can treat all arguments as deductive, why follow the 
standard practice . . .  and introduce a distinct conception of 
inductive argument. (Groarke 1999: p. 14)
Having one useful heuristic that can be used to evaluate any argument, whether that 
argument be inductive, conductive, analogical, abductive, etc., is much simpler than 
having several methods to evaluate these arguments.
Reconstructive deductivism offers a useful way to understand and evaluate 
arguments. Other approaches which use many different standards of evaluation multiply 
classification schemes and evaluative strategies beyond necessity because all arguments 
can be understood and evaluated, according to Groarke, as deductively valid arguments. 
Regardless of what beliefs an arguer may or may not have, or even whether any 
justificatory structure can be grasped as implicitly deductively valid, the pragmatic 
method of justification states that all arguments are usefully evaluated as deductively 
valid. Classifying arguments as deductively valid is useful because it avoids the need of 
identifying a multiplicity of reconstructive strategies for argument evaluation. It is better 
to be a deductivist, according to Groarke, “with one good trick” than to have to classify 
arguments according to a plethora of types each with its own different evaluative strategy 
and have, so to speak, “a bag of tricks” (Groarke 1999b: p. 44).
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In practice, arguers rarely make claims about how their premises are connected 
with their conclusion. It is argumentation theorists who make such claims and classify 
ordinary arguments as, for instance, either deductive or inductive arguments. Groarke 
maintains that “the inductive/deductive distinction is a theoretical distinction which is 
imposed on ordinary argumentation, rather than one which guides it in practice. And it is 
a distinction difficult to apply in practice, for those arguments normally classified as 
inductive arguments can usually be construed as deductive enthymemes which include 
implicit premises and conclusion” (Groarke 1999b: p. 37). This difficulty in classifying 
ordinary arguments according to the deductive/inductive distinction is amplified when 
“the plethora of distinctions which now characterize many variants of argumentation 
theory” (Groarke 1999b: p. 37) are introduced into a classification and evaluation scheme 
for argumentation. Groarke’s version of deductivism is useful because it does not run 
into such classification problems. According to Groarke, all arguments can be 
understood as deductively valid arguments and can be evaluated according to the 
methodology of reconstructive deductivism.
It is important to note that the pragmatic justifications can work independently of 
normative and psychological justifications. Psychological justifications for 
reconstructive deductivism make claims about arguers’ intentions and/or beliefs that 
justify our reconstruction of arguments as deductively valid. Normative justifications 
state that arguments are such that, in order to be seen as arguments, can be reconstructed 
so that they are deductively valid. Pragmatic justifications, by contrast, only say that 
reconstructing arguments as deductively valid is useful in logical and dialectical 
evaluation. It is entirely possible, on the pragmatic justification, that there are many
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different normative standards for good argument, or that arguers have beliefs that their 
conclusion follows from their premises without being entailed by them. All that 
pragmatic justifications contend is that reconstructing arguments as deductively valid is a 
useful way to evaluate arguments and advance critical discussion surrounding them, and 
that it is simpler than adopting a theory of argument which includes several different 
methods of evaluation.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter an account has been developed of reconstructive deductivism 
within the informal logic and argumentation theory literature. We began by looking at 
the historical development of informal logic and explained how deductivism fits within 
this tradition. We then looked specifically at Leo Groarke’s version of NLD. Examples 
of how Groarke applies this strategy to real world arguments including typically non- 
deductive arguments were offered. I then showed that Groarke uses three of the four 
different justificatory strategies that were outlined in the previous chapter: psychological, 
a normative, and a pragmatic justificatory strategy. His psychological strategy attributes 
beliefs that must be attributed to arguers as a necessary condition of them being 
understood to be making an argument. The beliefs that are attributed to an arguer, 
Groarke claims provide us with a reason to reconstruct any argument as deductively 
valid. Groarke’s normative justification for reconstructive deductivism identifies that all 
rational structures can be understood as deductively valid structures. A norm or standard 
placed on any claim-reasons complex is that “if the premises are true, then the conclusion
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is true”. Therefore, we are justified in reconstructing an argument as deductively valid. 
However, because we can understand all arguments as deductively valid does not mean 
that we ought to treat them as such. Groarke’s pragmatic justifications for reconstructive 
deductivism asserts that reconstructive deductive is a more useful method of 
understanding and evaluating arguments then the alternatives. For Groarke, it is simpler 
than adopting several different it advances critical discussion and it is better than 
adopting several different evaluative standards and classificatory categories. The 
pragmatic justification of reconstructive deductivism, therefore, supplements the other 
justificatory methods by not only establishing that all arguments may be interpreted as 
deductively valid, but by showing that there is pragmatic efficacy in doing so.
In the next chapter we will look at some of the criticisms of deductivism that have 
been raised in the informal logic literature. In the last chapter, I will raise some of my 
own criticisms.
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CHAPTER III 
THE DIALECTICS OF DEDUCTIVISM
3.1 Overview
In the last chapter I explained the theory of inferential adequacy developed by 
Leo Groarke and examined the justifications that he employs for this theory. In this 
chapter I am going to cover some of the criticisms raised against Groarke’s position from 
within the informal logical and argumentation theory communities. I will also examine 
Groarke’s responses to those criticisms. In the next chapter I am going to raise some of 
my own criticisms of reconstructive deductivism and show how they bear on Groarke’s 
view.
3.2 Introduction
Having gotten hold of what reconstructive deductivism is and what justifications 
have been used to support it, we can now look at some criticisms of deductivism that 
have been developed in the informal logic literature. I will evaluate both Govier’s and 
Johnson’s criticisms, and Groarke’s responses to them. One trend that emerges is that 
both Johnson and Govier, while critiquing reconstructive deductivism, advance 
arguments that are more effective against normative deductivism and the normative 
justification for reconstructive deductivism. Govier was concerned with the sorts of 
deductivism that were being advanced in the broader philosophical community such as in
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Gerald Nosich’s Reason and Arguments (1982) (Govier 1987: p. 22-24). Johnson’s 
main criticism is directed against FDL and the version of deductivism that Groarke 
develops in Groarke (1992), which seems to have greater affinity with normative 
deductivism than it does with Groarke’s more mature views articulated in (1999) and 
(2002). While Groarke (1992) is advocating a version o f “‘reconstructive’ deductivism” 
(Groarke 1992: p. 114), he is also endorsing a version of normative deductivism quite 
explicitly. The point that I will develop is that the criticisms raised by Johnson and 
Govier apply to normative deductivism but are not as effective against reconstructive 
deductivism. It is still useful, however, to evaluate these criticisms because (1) important 
components of Groarke’s defense of normative deductivism are incorporated into later 
accounts of reconstructive deductivism and (2) because the criticisms raise important 
points that a plausible version of deductivism must be able to address.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I start by looking at Govier’s criticisms 
of deductivism and Groarke’s response. Next I will look at Johnson’s criticism of FDL- 
deductivism and Groarke’s response to these criticisms. Johnson lists seven adequacy 
conditions that any plausible theory of argument must satisfy and then claims that FDL- 
deductivism does not satisfy four of those adequacy conditions. I conclude with the point 
that the criticisms raised by Govier and Johnson are more compelling criticisms of 
normative deductivism and the normative justification for reconstructive deductivism.
But these criticisms need not transfer to problems with NLD.
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3.3 Govier’s Criticisms of Deductivism
In the article, “In Defense of Deductivism: Replying to Govier,” Groarke 
describes his project as “sketching a defense of the view, common in formal logic, that all 
good arguments are deductively valid” (Groarke 1992: p. 111). It would seem that here 
Groarke is more interested in defending a version of normative deductivism—the view 
that all good arguments should be construed as deductively valid—than he is in 
defending the version of reconstructive deductivism which he develops in the 1999 and 
2002 articles. Although in the 1992 article, Groarke does adopt a reconstructive strategy 
for argument evaluation, this strategy is used as way to make plausible the view that good 
arguments are deductively valid. In the 1992 article Groarke picks out three problems 
with deductivism that are raised in Govier’s critique: (1) deductivism places “too much 
emphasis on deductive validity, failing to allow for different degrees of logical support,” 
(2) deductivism “eliminates all talk of fallacies,” and (3) deductivism “leaves us with the 
insurmountable task of providing a plausible policy for reconstructing arguments which 
are, on the face of it, deductively invalid” (Groarke 1992: pp. 114-115). These 
objections, as Godden points out, are “the standard objections to deductivism as 
identified by Groarke and Gerritsen” (Godden 2005: p. 170), and attributed to logicians 
such as Govier. I want to look at these criticisms and see whether Groarke’s responses to 
them are adequate.
The first criticism—that deductivism places “too much emphasis on deductive 
validity” (Groarke 1992: p. 114)—is related to a criticism developed by Stove (1970).
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Stove makes five general observations about gradations of support that premises can 
provide for their conclusion:
First: some arguments are ‘positively conclusive’ . . . .  That is, a 
completely rational being who knew or believed in their premises would 
have a positive degree of belief in their conclusion. Second, some 
arguments are ‘absolutely conclusive’ . . . .  That is, a completely rational 
being who knew or believed the premises would have in the conclusion a 
positive degree of belief not less than that which he has in the premises.
Both of the foregoing propositions are proved by the example of valid 
arguments; for any valid argument is absolutely conclusive and a fortiori 
positively conclusive.. . .  Third: some arguments are ‘absolutely 
inconclusive’. . . .  A completely rational being . . . who knew or believed 
(only) their premises would not have any positive degree of belief in their 
conclusion. Examples to prove this proposition can easily be concocted 
artificially, if they should be thought not abundant enough in real life.
Fourth: some arguments are ‘more conclusive’ . . . than others. Two 
arguments, that is, are sometimes such that, of two completely rational 
beings who knew respectively only the premises of one of the arguments, 
one would have some positive degree of belief in the conclusion, while the 
other would have, in the other conclusion, either a lower positive degree of 
belief or else no positive degree of belief at all. . . . Fifth: all absolutely 
irrational arguments are invalid. (Stove 1970: pp. 76-77)
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Stove then goes on to discuss differing standpoints on the question of: “Are all invalid 
arguments absolutely irrational?” (Stove 1970: p. 77). One standpoint, which Stove calls 
Probabilism, answers in the negative to the above question, while the other standpoint, 
which Stove calls Deductivism, answers in the affirmative. Probabilism, according to 
Stove, is the thesis that, “some invalid arguments are more conclusive or more reasonable 
than others” while Deductivism is the “contradictory of Probabilism” and asserts that “all 
invalid arguments . . .  are absolutely irrational; or there are no different degrees of 
support or reasonableness among invalid arguments” (Stove 1970: p. 77). Stove then 
goes on to argue some invalid arguments are more conclusive than others. He gives the 
following example: ‘“This is a flame, so it is hot’ and ‘This is a flame, and all of the 
many flames observed in the past have been hot, so, this is hot’.” Stove says, “both are 
invalid. If deductivism is true, both are therefore, absolutely irrational, and neither is 
more conclusive than the other. But one of these inferences is more conclusive then the 
other. Whence Deductivism is false” (Stove 1970: p. 89).
This criticism is picked up by Govier. However, it applies to normative 
deductivism more so than it does to reconstructive deductivism. The criticisms most 
effectively applies to the sort of deductivism articulated by Nosich when he asserts:
Truth and validity are two basic concepts in logical analysis because, for 
an argument to be sound (to prove its conclusion), it must be both valid 
and have true premises. Moreover, if you have a valid argument and all of 
its premises are true you have proved the conclusion. When it comes right
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down to it, validity and truth of the premises are all there is to a good 
argument. (Nosich 1982: p. 27)
The importance of Stove’s criticism is to show that there are invalid arguments that are 
more rational than others and that not all invalid arguments are bad. There are some 
invalid arguments that are good and, therefore, the view that all good arguments are 
deductively valid is false. If you recall earlier chapters, a reconstructive deductivist using 
the pragmatic justification is open to the existence of invalid arguments that are good; 
they just claim that such arguments should be evaluated by making them deductively 
valid arguments. Therefore, this criticism would not directly undercut a reconstructive 
deductivist thesis, though it would raise questions about the viability of a normative 
deductivist thesis. Nevertheless, Groarke (1992) aims to defend the view not only that 
non-deductive arguments should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments, but 
that the only good arguments that are transparently invalid have “implicit premises that 
guarantee their validity” (Groarke 1992: p. 114). So, I think, at least the reconstructive 
strategy that Groarke is advancing to respond to the criticisms of Govier has closer 
affinities with normative deductivism than do his later defenses.
However, Groarke (1992) develops a response to Govier’s criticism that 
illustrates how deductivism—even of a normative variety—could address the problems of 
why some invalid arguments are better than others. Groarke’s response advances the 
view that these arguments are not really invalid, but that they have implicit premises that 
make them valid arguments, and that these implicit premises can be assessed as having
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different degrees of acceptability from good to bad that will correspond to the overall 
acceptability of the argument.
Groarke thinks “there are ways that a deductivist can account for the inconclusive 
nature of arguments” (Groarke 1992: p. 115). This enables a deductivist to resist the 
Stove/Govier criticism that it cannot allow for different degrees of logical support. If 
deductivism can maintain the view that “all arguments are deductively valid” and still 
account for the inconclusive character that many natural arguments have, then 
deductivism is not committed to the view that all arguments have the same degree of 
support. Therefore, if Groarke is correct that deductivism can offer a viable way of 
evaluating arguments that have varying degrees of conclusiveness (strength), then it is 
not radically out of step with the ordinary practice of making arguments that do not 
advance necessary support for their conclusion. Instead deductively valid arguments can 
have probable, acceptable, tentative, or other types of conclusions. Groarke thinks 
arguments can both have conclusions that are entailed by their premises and also be 
probabilistic, acceptable, plausible, tentative, and all other degrees of certainty. If this is 
the case, then he can respond to the Stove/Govier critique by claiming that while 
deductively invalid arguments are equally bad arguments, this criticism is not 
problematic for deductivism. It is not problematic for Groarke because deductive validity 
can portray any degree of support that ‘so called’ inductive arguments can exhibit. He 
gives a couple of examples of arguments that entail probable and plausible conclusions to 
illustrate this point. They are as follows:
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1. If Lithuania ever leaves the Soviet Union, its economy will probably 
decline.
2. Lithuania will eventually leave the Soviet Union.
3. Therefore its economy will probably decline. (Groarke 1992: 115)
And:
1. The examination of a random sample of Brand X computers 
manufactured in 1989 shows that 95% of them are defective.
2. Therefore it is probable that there is something wrong with the one you 
bought. (Groarke 1992: p. 115)
Groarke claims that both these arguments are deductively valid—the first one in virtue of 
“the rules of propositional logic.. . .  The second.. .  in virtue of the meaning of the term 
probable” (Groarke 1992: p. 115). Both examples have inconclusive conclusions in the 
sense that the conclusion does not make an unqualified judgment about Lithuania’s 
economic decline or about the quality of the brand X computer you bought; but the 
arguments, so Groarke claims, are deductively valid, nevertheless. According to Groarke, 
if their premises are true, then their conclusion must also be true. We might challenge the 
premises of the argument by stating that there is no evidence to think that Lithuania’s 
economy will decline. One might say that Lithuania has abundant untapped natural 
resources and the will and capability to take advantage of these resources, so the 
Lithuanian economy will not decline. The premise, then, that Lithuania’s economy will 
probably decline would not be true. This does not mean that the argument is not 
deductively valid. The premises still entail a conclusion that is a probabilistic claim from
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premises that are probabilistic claims. Deductive arguments, such as the above, 
therefore, seem to be able to exhibit support for their conclusions that is less than 
conclusive.
That deductive arguments can portray differing degrees of conclusiveness would 
seem to provide a reply to Stove’s criticism. One needs to be cautious here, though. 
Groarke’s reply could not be that invalid arguments can be better than other invalid 
arguments—all invalid arguments would remain equally inconclusive. Groarke’s reply is 
rather that a deductivist can show why some arguments which are transparently invalid 
seem better than others. The deductivist would simply make explicit the implicit premise 
and evaluate its acceptability; the more acceptable the premise, the better the argument. 
Therefore, the reason why some invalid arguments are better than others is that they have 
implicit, valid-making premises that are more acceptable than other valid-making 
premises. Groarke’s reply is not that some invalid arguments are better than other invalid 
arguments, but that some invalid arguments have valid-making assumptions that make 
them better than other invalid arguments.
A common mistake made in regards to the nature of deductive inference, 
according to Groarke, is that deductive inferences are often treated as P —»■ nC: that is, the 
premises of a deductive argument “entail a necessary conclusion” (Groarke 1999: p. 3).
In fact, however, deductive arguments have the following form □ (P —» C). This form 
implies that (aP —*■ nC), not that aC follows from P; that is to say, deductive arguments 
operate in such a way that the conclusion is just as necessary as the premises (Groarke 
1999: p. 3). Groarke claims that this logical fact about the nature of deductive inference
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. . . implies that the conclusion of a deductive argument must be as 
certain as its premises. A deductive argument should therefore be 
described as ‘certainty preserving’ rather than ‘certainty establishing’. In 
natural language arguments, this means that the conclusion of a good 
deductive argument is more often probable or plausible than necessary, for 
the premises of such arguments are rarely certain. (Groarke 1999: pp. 3-4)
Thus, the degree of certainty in the premises will carry over to the degree of certainty in 
the conclusion in a valid argument. In a valid argument the degree of acceptability of the 
conclusion varies directly with the degree of acceptability of the weakest premise. Many 
possible degrees of support may be conceived. For instance, the following is a valid 
deductive argument:
1. If an election were called in the near future, there is a small chance 
that the NDP would win.
2. A federal election will be called in the near future.
3. Therefore, there is a small chance that the NDP will win that election.
However, there is a low degree of probability, “a small chance” that the claim that ‘the 
NDP will win the next election’ is true. It is possible that they could win. It is, however, 
true that it is probably not the case that they will win. The conclusion is entailed by the 
premises, but what is entailed is not that the NDP will win, only that there is a small 
chance that the NDP will win the next election. Hence, the conclusion of the above
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argument does not make a conclusive judgment about the success of the NDP in the next 
federal election but rather, according to Groarke, the conclusion which makes the 
inconclusive judgment that ‘there is a small chance the NDP will win’ is entailed.
I think there are problems with this line of defense that Groarke develops against 
the Stove/Govier criticism. However, I want to forego discussion of these problems until 
later in this chapter and the next chapter. We will see that Johnson is also concerned 
about deductivism’s ability to portray arguments that offer different degrees of support 
for their conclusion. I think that this criticism raised by Johnson and Govier poses some 
troubles for deductivism and that Groarke’ response, developed above, does not 
completely eliminate those concerns. But I propose to set these issues aside for the time 
being and pick them up again later.
What about Govier’s second criticism that deductivism removes all talk of 
fallacies? Govier says,
A fallacy is an error in reasoning. Logical tradition advises that fallacies 
do exist. Fallacies in the logical sense are not mistaken assumptions or 
beliefs; they are errors in reasoning. For fallaces in this sense to exist, 
people must sometimes make mistakes in inferring conclusions from 
premises.. .  But on the common understanding of ‘fallacy’, there may be 
no fallacies for the deductivist, because every argument can be made 
deductively valid. (Govier 1987: p. 27)
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In response to this criticism Groarke claims that, “the problem with this aspect of 
Govier’s critique is her expressively narrow account of what a fallacy is” (Groarke 1992 
p. 116). Groarke says,
In answer to [Govier’s] account, it may be said that it makes more sense to 
construe ‘reasoning’ and ‘fallacy’ in a broader way that encompasses 
questions and problems about the status of the premises in an argument.
The fallacy ‘begging the question’ arises, not because the conclusion of an 
argument cannot be inferred from the premises (on the contrary the 
argument is typically valid), but because the premises are objectionable.
The fallacy ‘equivocation’ can be said to arise when an argument contains 
an implicit premise to the effect that two distinct uses of an expression are 
equivalent. A faulty ad hominem may depend upon the belief that a 
particular authority knows the truth of a particular claim. Even formal 
fallacies like ‘affirming the consequent’ and ‘denying the antecedent’ can 
be described as mistaken assumptions (and thus implicit premises) about 
what constitutes a valid form of inference. In general, different kinds of 
assumptions are associated with different kinds of fallacies and the 
deductivist can distinguish them accordingly. (Groarke 1992: p. 117)
This defense seems underdeveloped. While Groarke might be able to offer a deductivist 
account of fallacy, a detailed account of how a deductivist would identify traditional 
fallacies of inference is still needed. Certainly a deductivist would have little problem
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identifying an ad hominem fallacy where the attack on the person would take the form of 
a premise, but it is more difficult to see how the account could be extended to 
equivocation or the traditional formal fallacies without examples. I am not suggesting 
that this is in principle not possible. To the contrary, the deductivist does have options 
here. For instance, take the following example of affirming the consequent:
1. If it rained, then the streets will be wet.
2. The streets are wet.
3. Therefore, it rained.
The deductivist might say that this argument makes the underlying assumption 
that
li. If the streets are wet, then it rained.
We could then be able to evaluate the acceptability of this premise. We might think, for
instance, that wet streets are not good evidence for their having been rain because wet
streets are often the result of the streets being washed, or of a lot of moisture being in the 
air, or of the neighbors watering their lawn. Adding the valid-making premise (li) to the 
above argument allows us to expose the argument’s weakness. Having added this 
premise we can see why the initial argument is fallacious when we assess the 
acceptability of the premises.
Groarke, however, needs to show how a reconstructive deductivist method can 
account for the entire spectrum of fallacies if he wants to answer Govier’s objection by
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claiming that deductivism is consistent with fallacy theory. While the example just 
provided illustrates one suggestion for how reconstructive deductivism might explain the 
formal fallacy ‘affirming the consequent,’ it is not clear that a similar strategy can be 
used to account for ‘equivocation,’ or ‘begging the question.’ Perhaps deductivism can 
provide a satisfactory analysis of these fallacies, although to show that it can do so 
requires more detailed explanation.
Govier’s last criticism of deductivism is that it requires an unreasonable 
reconstructive strategy. In my view Groarke’s answer to this criticism is less satisfactory 
than his answer to the other two objections. He claims that this is not only a problem for 
deductivism but for any theory of argument: “it must . . .  be said that the recognition of 
implicit premises in arguments is not required only of deductivism, and that any plausible 
theory of argument must make room for implicit premises” (Groarke 1992: p. 117). 
Groarke correctly points out the difficulty of coming up with a theory of how to account 
for implicit premises. It often is the case that arguers base their arguments on implicit 
assumptions. How do we identify what these implicit assumptions are? Do we evaluate 
arguments with or without incorporating the implicit assumptions? These are questions 
that a good theory of argument must address. So, Groarke is right to point out that any 
theory of argument faces difficulties in addressing these problems. But, as I understand 
Govier, she is making the point that a deductive reconstruction of many arguments can 
often require the addition of premises to the argument that distort the original argument.
A deductivist theory of argument not only faces the challenge of identifying what the 
missing premise(s) are but also of accurately representing what the transparently invalid 
argument states. The point that Govier is making is that the deductivist will be forced to
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add premises that might distort the meaning of the argument, not simply that it will have 
difficulties in identifying implicit premise(s). This is the point of Govier’s analogy in 
which she compares the view a deductivist takes towards argument to looking at the 
world through purple lenses. She says,
Reconstructive Deductivism allows and requires us to do too much to the 
data. If we look at the world through purple glasses, it will appear purple, 
but little is proven by such observations. Similarly, if we look at people’s 
arguments through deductivist spectacles, all arguments will appear as 
complete, incomplete, or failed deductions. But little that is real is seen.
(Govier 1987: p. 27)
The claim here is that treating all arguments as deductive arguments will distort some 
arguments. This is what, according to Govier, makes reconstructive deductivism a 
problematic policy for argument evaluation. Groarke’s response that any theory of 
argument will face difficulties developing an adequate reconstructive policy does not 
address Govier’s criticism that deductivism distorts some arguments.
There are a couple of things that need to be pointed out about Govier’s criticism. 
First, it is explicitly directed against reconstructive deductivism. The criticism based on 
Stove’s point that deductivism cannot account for a spectrum of rational support among 
invalid arguments more directly undercuts normative deductivism. However, if it is true 
that reconstructing arguments so that they are deductively valid distorts some of the 
arguments being evaluated, then that would be a criticism of reconstructive deductivism’s
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feasibility as an evaluative strategy. However, Govier’s criticism requires further 
elaboration. I develop this criticism in the next chapter, so I shall set it aside for the time 
being.
To sum up, we have seen that Govier’s first criticism makes a good case against 
strong normative deductivism. The claim that there is no way for a strong normative 
deductivist to account for some invalid arguments being better than other invalid 
arguments is correct. If the strong normative deductivist claims that the only good 
arguments are deductively valid arguments, it would seem that they are committed to the 
view that all invalid arguments are equally bad. However, they are not so committed. 
Stove’s flame example illustrates the point nicely; there are degrees of goodness amongst 
invalid arguments. In response, Groarke develops a reconstructive strategy that would 
show how any good argument is deductively valid and shows how this strategy can 
account for different degrees of conclusiveness amongst arguments. Groarke thinks that 
any good argument will have an implicit premise that makes the argument deductively 
valid. All that we are required to do is locate that implicit premise and assess its degree 
of acceptability. This does not lead to all deductively valid arguments supporting 
necessary conclusions. Rather, the conclusions’ acceptability would come in varying 
degrees. Hence, a normative deductivist employing a reconstructive strategy can account 
for how arguments have degrees of strength and yet are still deductively valid.
It is not clear how effective the criticism about deductivism’s ability to handle 
fallacies is. In principle it is not impossible for a reconstructive deductivist to have an 
account o f fallacies consistent with deductivism. Potentially, both normative and
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reconstructive deductivists might be able to offer such an account. However, an account 
still needs to be provided for exactly how deductivism analyses fallacies.
Finally, Groarke’s response to Govier’s third objection is not satisfactory, 
although neither is Govier’s criticism. On Groarke’s part we want to know why it is that 
evaluating a transparently invalid argument as a deductively valid argument is not 
evaluating a different argument; on Govier’s behalf, we want more details about how 
reconstructive deductivism distorts some arguments.
The most effective criticism that Govier raises then is against strong normative 
deductivism, although Groarke’s response does seem to suggest that reconstructive 
deductivism can address this criticism. A large part of the next chapter will examine the 
question of whether reconstructive deductivism does distort arguments in the process of 
evaluating them.
In appraising the debate between Govier and Groarke, Johnson says, in regards to 
Govier’s criticism that “Govier’s arguments may not be sufficient to dispense with 
deductivism entirely, but they seem sufficient to cast doubt on its validity” (Johnson 
2000: p. 69). Johnson thinks that the best argument against deductivism stems from its 
inability to satisfy the adequacy conditions that any good theory of argument must 
satisfy. In the next section I will assess Johnson’s argument against deductivism.
3.4 Johnson’s Critique of Deductivism
Johnson claims that “the strongest argument against FDL-deductivism as a theory 
of argument emerges when [viewed] . . .  through the perspective of the adequacy
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requirements” (Johnson 2000: p. 78). The adequacy requirements are the seven 
requirements that Johnson thinks any good theory of argument must satisfy (Johnson 
2000: pp. 52-56). Deductivism for Johnson is strongly affiliated with FDL.1 In fact, 
Johnson’s argument from the adequacy conditions focuses on formal logic. But, even 
while so focusing his argument, Johnson implies that in dispensing with FDL, 
deductivism of the nonformal or NLD variety can also be dispensed with. I argue that the 
problems which formal logic has meeting the adequacy conditions do not transfer to 
natural language deductivism.
Johnson’s argument against formal logic-deductivism is clearly laid out. He 
argues that: (1) a good theory of argument must meet seven adequacy conditions; (2) 
FDL-deductivism does not meet four of the adequacy conditions for a good theory of 
argument; therefore, (3) FDL-deductivism is not a good theory of argument. For my 
purposes it will be sufficient to narrow in on the four adequacy conditions that Johnson 
thinks formal logic-deductivism does not meet. It will be seen that while formal logic 
does not meet these adequacy conditions, Groarke’s brand of deductivism is more 
resistant. In fact, as Groarke indicates in a response to Johnson’s criticism, mixing 
Groarke’s deductivism in with formal logic is to conflate it with something that it is not.
'There are two things to note here. Groarke does not take deductivism and FDL to be strongly affiliated and 
thinks to do so is a mistake. The other thing I want to mention is that I cannot find a spot where Johnson in fact 
says that deductivism is equivalent to FDL so he may have something else in mind here. It might, therefore, 
not be fair for me to take this as his strongest argument against Groarke. Johnson does, however, strongly 
associate deductivism with FDL, almost as if  it were a variation o f  FDL. He says, “the theory I call FDL is 
closely related to . . . deductivism ” (Johnson 2000: p 59). Further, directly after his discussion o f  the problems 
with deductivism Johnson provides the final blow against FDL in a form o f  argumentation “that deductivists 
will appreciate” and says o f  this argumentation that it is, “the strongest argument against FDL-deductivism as a 
theory o f  argument” (Johnson 2000: p. 78). Hence, I will treat Johnson’s argument contra FDL from the 
adequacy conditions to be Johnson’s strongest argument against deductivism.
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Having said this, it will, as I move forward, become apparent that Johnson’s 
criticism that “deductivism cannot satisfy the all-important” (Johnson 2000: p. 77) fourth 
adequacy condition poses a serious problem for normative deductivism. This criticism, I 
think, resembles the Stove/Govier criticism. However, Groarke’s version of 
reconstructive deductivism can address this problem. I will examine the third, fifth, and 
sixth adequacy conditions and show how NLD can, in principle, satisfy them. I will then 
return to the fourth condition and explore it in more depth.
The third adequacy condition is the first of the seven adequacy conditions for a 
good theory of argument that formal logic-deductivism fails to satisfy. Johnson’s third 
adequacy condition states that “the theory of argument must contain a theory of appraisal 
that recognizes that there can be good arguments for a given position as well as against 
it” (Johnson 2000: p. 79). According to Johnson, formal logic-deductivism does not meet 
this condition since for formal logic-deductivism there cannot be a sound argument for 
~p and also one for p. That is, there cannot be good arguments for two opposing 
positions, given the soundness criterion. An argument must have true premises and make 
a valid inference from these premises for it to be a good argument, for it to be sound.
You can have valid arguments for two opposing positions, but only one can have true 
premises, as two opposing positions can’t both be true. Therefore, according to formal 
logic-deductivism, only one of the arguments is good.
Formal logic is susceptible to this problem, but Groarke thinks that this problem is 
not faced by NLD. Groarke provides an example of two deductive arguments that are 
good but take opposing positions on an issue. Consider a trial where there are two
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reliable witnesses to a crime, each of whom thinks he saw a different person commit the
crime.
1. Paula says that she saw Y commit the crime.
2. Her testimony is reliable.
3. So, Y probably committed the crime. (Groarke 2002: p. 282)
And,
1. Louis says that X committed the crime.
2. His testimony is reliable.
3. So, X probably committed the crime. (Groarke 2002: p. 282)
Both of these arguments, while taking opposing positions on the assumption that only one 
person committed the crime, are “plausible, for both are valid and have premises that are 
acceptable” (Groarke 2002: p. 282). These arguments can also be turned into deductive 
arguments by adding a missing premise that a person who is reliable is usually correct. 
Groarke suggests that deductivism need not, as we saw, have truth as a requirement.
What is needed for an argument to be good is that its conclusion be entailed by its 
premises and that the premises have virtues that make them acceptable, such as being 
highly probable or plausible premises. It is not required of an argument that the premises 
be true for us to assert that the argument is good. The point to get from these examples is 
that it is plausible that X or Y could have committed the crime and that we can support 
each with good deductive arguments.
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FDL requires truth for an argument to be sound. But arguments in everyday 
conversation are often based on claims whose truth is not known (that is, it is uncertain if 
they are true or false), and the arguments are still good. Groarke’s variation of 
reconstructive deductivism weakens the requirement of truth for good arguments and, 
thus, allows good arguments to have premises that are acceptable without their having a 
known tmth status. Deductivism permits that there are two good arguments that take 
opposing stands on an issue so long as both arguments have acceptable premises. In 
other words, arguments can have acceptable premises which are not true, or have an 
unknown truth status, and we can still say that the arguments in which such acceptable 
premises are found are good. NLD is, therefore, not forced to say that there are never 
good arguments for two sides of an issue. NLD can, thus, meet Johnson’s third adequacy 
condition since it can account for there being “good arguments for or against a given 
issue” by changing the truth requirement to admit arguments with acceptable premises 
which have an unknown truth status (Johnson 2000: p. 79).
Johnson’s criticism that sound arguments cannot be offered for and against a 
position does force the deductivist to make a choice. Either deductivism is false or truth 
is not a requirement for argument goodness. Groarke does not want to give up on 
deductivism, so he takes the requirement for good arguments to be acceptability instead 
of truth. Lowering the standard to acceptability does not mean that truth has no role in a 
deductivist theory o f argument. Deductivism needs truth for the very definition of 
argument, since a deductive argument is defined as an argument where the truth of its 
premises is inconsistent with the falsity of its conclusion. But the fact that the definition
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of deductive argument relies on the notion of truth does not imply that deductivism insists 
that all arguments have true premises.
Certainly, a deductivist would think that there is only one argument with true 
premises when two arguments lead to inconsistent conclusions. It does not make sense 
that both ‘/ f  and are true even if there are good arguments supporting both of those 
claims. The deductivist would, in such situations, have to say that one of the arguments 
has a true conclusion, while the other does not. However, just because the deductivist 
needs to admit that only one of the conclusions can be true does not mean the deductivist 
must insist that ‘p ’ and ‘~p’ cannot have good deductive arguments based on acceptable 
premises defending them. It is entirely possible that there are two deductive arguments 
with opposing conclusions whose premises are acceptable yet inconclusive in terms of 
their truth status. When this is the case we usually look for further arguments to settle 
which view is correct. We know that both arguments cannot have true premises so we 
seek better arguments, or we seek to illustrate that the argument for the alternative 
conclusion does not have true premises.
Recall, for instance, Groarke’s legal example. We have two deductive arguments 
supporting different conclusions. One conclusion says that X probably committed the 
crime and one says that Y probably committed the crime. Both conclusions are based on 
the respective testimonies of reliable witnesses. Both conclusions, however, cannot be 
true. This example points out that we need to question which conclusion is in fact the 
correct one. Any enquiry can bring out arguments that support different conclusions. 
Johnson thinks that deductivism cannot account for this fact because it relies too strongly 
on truth as a requirement for evaluation of argument goodness. Groarke shows, however,
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how deductivism can address this issue by making acceptability a requirement for 
argument goodness. But, we can have two contradictory conclusions that are both 
acceptable and based on arguments with acceptable premises. What such contradictory 
results ought to indicate is that further investigation is required to determine which 
conclusion is more acceptable. Consider the following examples:
1. Burning fossil fuels increases global warming.
2. Global warming threatens the future of life on planet earth.
3. We should not endanger life.
4. Therefore, we should not bum fossil fuels.
And,
1. Burning fossil fuels creates jobs.
2. Creating jobs gives people a livelihood.
3. We ought to help people have a livelihood.
4. Therefore, we ought to bum fossil fuels.
These arguments move from acceptable premises to acceptable conclusions. However, 
the conclusions imply opposing courses of action. We cannot take both courses at the 
same time. We should, therefore, seek to determine which course of action is better. One 
way of doing this would be to determine which is more important, human life or 
employment. Consider the following argument:
1. Burning fossil fuels causes global warming.
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2. Global warming threatens the future of human life on planet earth.
3. Human life trumps employment.
4. Burning fossil fuels creates jobs.
5. Creating jobs gives people a livelihood.
6. Creating livelihoods for people is something we ought to do.
7. Therefore, we shouldn’t bum fossil fuels.
In this argument we have added premise (3) and combined some of the premises from the 
other two arguments. One could advance an argument such as this to show how the 
premises of the first two arguments can be acceptable when, given additional 
considerations—such as those raised in (3)—only one of the conclusions is correct. The 
above argument’s premises are consistent with each other and they are acceptable 
premises. While the premises, ‘burning fossil fuels creates jobs,’ ‘creating jobs gives 
people a livelihood,’ and ‘creating livelihoods is something we ought to do’ are 
acceptable, they do not support the conclusion that ‘we ought to bum fossil fuels’—as 
they do in the second argument—because we have added the premise that ‘human life 
tmmps employment’. This added premise, together with the premises that ‘global 
warming threatens the future of human life on planet earth’ and ‘burning fossil fuels 
causes global warming’ entail the conclusion, even if premises 4-6 are acceptable.
It is possible that even this argument’s conclusion is not true. It would have to 
respond to other good arguments that challenged its acceptability or provided good 
reasons supporting rival conclusions. The point to take from this discussion is that in 
giving up tmth as a standard for premise adequacy, deductivism does not jeopardize the
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ability to settle arguments that support opposing positions. In fact, it can provide a 
framework in which we can advance dialectical enquiry.
In principle even normative deductivism can address the problem that Johnson 
raises for formal logic-deductivism with the third adequacy condition. Normative 
deductivism need not be committed to truth as a requirement of argument goodness. 
Acceptability would do just fine. Arguments with acceptable premises and a deductively 
valid inference would then be good arguments. For the normative deductivist there could 
then be good arguments for opposing standpoints with acceptable premises which have 
an unknown truth status.
Johnson’s criticism is a compelling criticism against the view which it is most 
ostensively directed towards, the view that formal logic is a good theory for evaluating 
everyday arguments. Here formal logic proposes soundness standards that equate a good 
argument with a sound argument; that is, with arguments that have true premises and a 
valid inference. On this model there cannot be good arguments for and against a position 
because both could not have true premises, so one of the arguments would have to be 
bad. However, the problems with formal logic do not transfer to Groarke’s deductivism 
because Groarke broadens the adequacy requirement on premises from truth to 
acceptability.
Johnson’s fifth adequacy condition states that “the standards for appraisal of 
argument should be such that . . .  the ordinary reasoner can decide whether or not these 
are satisfied in a given instance. In short, the criteria should be user-friendly” (Johnson 
2000: p. 80). Formal logic is taken to be non-user-friendly because of the technical sense
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of validity upon which it depends. Johnson thinks this standard is difficult to make 
“readily available to the ordinary reasoner” (Johnson 2000: p. 80).
Here again the strongest case is against formal logic and not deductivism. Formal 
logic is a complicated theoretical system that only very few arguers would ever 
conceivably be able to use for evaluating arguments. The formal logician who advocates 
the use of formal logic for argument evaluation may offer the following rejoinder to this 
criticism. They could claim that simply because many good arguers do not understand 
the process underlying the arguments they advance does not imply that the arguments 
they make are not in accordance with the norms of formal logic. However, I suspect that 
even good arguers—while their arguments might be in accordance with some of the 
norms of formal logic—would be pressed to translate a bit of language offered as an 
argument into predicate or modal logic and determine whether the argument’s conclusion 
necessarily follows from its premises. This illustrates to my mind that understanding the 
procedures and methods of formal logic does not give us a set of conceptual tools that are 
user-friendly.
It is a little easier to see how NLD would provide the ordinary reasoner with some 
basic conceptual tools that could aid in the process of evaluating arguments encountered 
on a day-to-day basis. Johnson says:
There is a problem with validity, understood in the technical sense: The 
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. There have been 
various attempts to make this standard readily available to the ordinary
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reasoner: for example, truth trees, possible world scenarios, and so forth. I 
am not convinced that any of them succeed. (Johnson 2000: p. 80)
I am, at least, not convinced that validity faces such a problem. Perhaps it is difficult to 
grasp all the semantic implications of a valid argument, so techniques like truth-trees or 
truth-tables were devised to help understand the effect validity has on the semantics of 
formal arguments. However, I take it that the everyday reasoner is quite able to 
recognize most cases of validity so long as they know what the word ‘validity’ means. 
However, even if they did not know what the word meant, my intuition is that they would 
be able to pick out many valid arguments from invalid ones. Take the following 
argument:
1. Jones is a politician.
2. So Jones must be crooked.
I think the average reasoner would recognize that this argument relies on the missing 
premise that all politicians are crooked. The average reasoner would probably think that 
the conclusion need not follow from the premise without the addition of such an implicit 
premise. For after all: why would we think Jones is crooked because he is a politician 
unless all politicians are crooked?
Moreover, adopting a reconstructive deductivist strategy, making explicit an 
implicit premise, and then evaluating the premise for acceptability seems to facilitate the 
process of argument evaluation in a manner that is accessible to the ordinary reasoner. It
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provides the ordinary reasoner with some basic tools that they could use to assess 
whether an argument is good or not. First, check the argument for validity and assess its 
given premises; second, if  the argument is not valid, add another premise that makes it 
valid and assess that premise for its degree of acceptability. If the added premise is 
acceptable, then the argument is good. This procedure seems to be a useful technique 
that anybody could learn in a couple of lessons and improve with further application in 
real-world scenarios.
In the end, however, this is an issue that ought to be settled through empirical 
study. If psychological research done on arguers suggests that the conceptual tools and 
evaluative criteria of deductivism cannot be adequately used and identified by the 
ordinary reasoner, then that would show that Johnson’s intuition that deductivism is not 
“user-friendly” is correct. If the research showed that it was “user-friendly” then my 
intuitions would be confirmed. There can be no definitive case made for or against 
Johnson’s claim that deductivism cannot meet adequacy condition five without further 
research. Therefore, while Johnson illustrates that formal logic has difficulties as a 
method which the ordinary reasoner can readily employ to evaluate everyday arguments, 
deductivism—at least it is reasonable to think—does not have the same problem.
Adequacy condition 6 says that a theory of argument “must be such as to allow 
for fruitful criticism.” Formal logic falls short since it is, according to Johnson, “limited” 
to the sound-unsound assessment of arguments (Johnson 2000: p. 80). As we have see 
this is not true of Groarke’s deductivism. Groarke’s deductivism is consistent with a 
plurality o f tactics and methods for evaluating and criticizing premises within a deductive 
framework. He presents a conception of deductivism which
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Recognizes that argument evaluation extends beyond assessment of 
validity, for a good deductive argument must begin with an accepted 
starting point and this means that its expressed and unexpressed premises 
must be acceptable. In the course of evaluating deductive arguments 
deductivism requires that we consider the acceptability of a proposed 
definition, an empirical claim, an eyewitness report, a principle of logic, a 
moral maxim and so on. (Groarke 1999: p. 9)
Thus, Groarke thinks of deductivism as allowing for a variety of normative strategies for 
assessing premise acceptability. The theory of acceptability that a deductivist might 
adopt could allow for different normative standards for the evaluation of empirical claims 
and moral claims; it might, as we saw earlier, also have techniques for evaluating 
fallacies and or definitions. The point is that deductivism is not limited to the sound- 
unsound criteria for evaluation, but can have a plurality of helpful criteria for the 
evaluation of arguments.
Again, Johnson’s criticisms of formal logic do not transfer to problems with 
Groarke’s deductivism. While formal logic is limited to the sound-unsound distinction as 
a criterion of evaluation, Groarke’s brand of reconstructive deductivism is not limited in 
the same way. Groarke’s deductivism is consistent with a plurality of normative 
techniques directed at the assessment of premise acceptability.
We now come to the crucial adequacy condition four. This adequacy condition 
states that a good theory of argument “must contain a theory of appraisal such that
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arguments exist on a continuum from weak to strong” (Johnson 2000: p. 79). Johnson
says,
Because validity is an all-or-nothing requirement and is necessary for 
soundness, in the end, arguments will be evaluated as either sound or not 
sound. There are, for FDL, no degrees of soundness; hence no degrees of 
logical virtue are possible. (Johnson 2000: p. 79)
But Groarke thinks that his version of deductivism is able to evade this criticism. 
Groarke’s version of reconstructive deductivism can convert degrees of logical virtue into 
degrees of premise acceptability. For any invalid argument we can evaluate its logical 
strength by adding a valid-making premise and assessing its acceptability. The different 
degrees of acceptability that the premise could have would correspond to different 
degrees of logical virtue present in the initial invalid argument. One example that is used 
by Groarke, Johnson, and Govier is the following:
Roses are red, violets are blue; therefore, Ed loves Sue.
This argument provides very weak reasons to endorse its conclusion. It seems, in fact, to 
be a plainly bad argument because the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion. Johnson 
thinks that we can identify this absurdity immediately and do not need deductivism to 
point it out to us. Deductivism, however, Groarke claims, simply evaluates this 
argument by adding a valid-making premise:
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If Roses are red and violets are blue, then Ed Loves Sue
The acceptability of this premise would be highly questionable. The color of roses and 
violets has nothing to do with whether Ed loves Sue. Reconstructive deductivism seems 
to be able to illustrate different degrees of logical support by adding a valid-making 
premise and assessing them for acceptability. In fact, if someone were to seriously 
advance an argument like the one above, the deductivist strategy seems to be exactly the 
procedure by which one would expose the inadequacy of the argument being advanced. 
Johnson acknowledges that “depending on how one unpacks [deductivism] there may be 
some flex in the truth requirement, although it is not typically understood that way” 
(Johnson 2000: p. 79). But consider the following argument:
1. The earth’s temperature rose by 1 C in the last ten years.
2. Therefore, there is strong evidence for global warming.
We could add to this argument the premise
li. If the earth’s temperature rose by 1 C in the last ten years then there is 
strong evidence for global warming.
We might then ask questions about how good this evidence is. Does it provide evidence 
for global warming? Is it a natural fluctuation in the earth’s temperature? Is it sufficient
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proof for the existence of global warming? And so on. These sorts of questions would go 
into determining how good the argument is. It seems entirely plausible that there are 
several degrees of acceptability that a premise can exhibit that would correspond to the 
logical strength of an argument. For instance, the cogency of the roses and violets 
argument is much lower than the acceptability of the global warming argument.
Moreover, we can assess the different degrees of acceptability of each respective 
argument with the toolbox of reconstructive deductivism; by adding a valid-making 
premise and assessing its acceptability.
I take Johnson’s criticism here to have affinities with the Stove/Govier criticism a 
full evaluation of which I set aside earlier in this chapter. I want to pick this line up again 
and provide a more complete discussion of it. Stove’s basic point was that deductivism 
leads to one type of premise-conclusion link—deductive validity. According to Stove 
there are no degrees of goodness for the deductivist amongst invalid arguments. All 
invalid arguments are equally bad. In the 1992 article Groarke claims that “soundness is 
the key to good argument. A sound argument is deductively valid and has premises that 
are true or at least acceptable. An argument is deductively valid if it is impossible for its 
premises to be true and its conclusion false” (Groarke 1992: p. 111 italics added). Every 
good argument that is transparently invalid will have an implicit valid-making premise. 
Probabilistic and plausible arguments that are good would all have implicit premises that 
would, together with the given premises, entail the conclusion. Therefore, Johnson and 
Stove/Govier are correct to point out that there is only one logical consequence relation 
between premises and conclusions according to such a version of deductivism. Consider 
the following arguments:
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1. Bill Clinton was a very good President.
2. Therefore, Hilary Clinton will probably be a very good president.
and
1. Socrates is a man.
2. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
In the first argument Groarke might say that there is the implicit assumption that Hilary 
Clinton will probably be as good a President as Bill Clinton and for the later argument 
we add the premise All men are mortal. In both of these arguments, according to 
Groarke, the premise-conclusion link is deductively valid. The inference to the 
conclusion in the second argument is just as necessary as the inference in the first.
This result, however, seems strange. We can evaluate the inference by assessing 
the added premise, but it certainly does not seem that the inference in the first argument 
is of the same strength as the inference in the second. Indeed, the inference in the second 
is necessary: Socrates cannot be a man if he is not mortal. However, Hilary Clinton’s 
probably being a good president may be false even if it is true that ‘Bill Clinton was a 
good president,’ although perhaps this claim gives some reason to think that she will be a 
good President. It seems as if the inference in the second argument is necessary when the 
inference in the first is not. Groarke’s reconstructive deductivism does not capture this 
difference of inferential character between these two arguments. It treats both of them as 
having identical inferences. I will have more to say on this in the next chapter.
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Even in the 1999 and 2002 articles, it is not clear to me whether Groarke would 
treat the above inferences as logically identical or not. It seems, however, at least in 
these articles that he need not treat them as identical. On the pragmatic justification for 
reconstructive deductivism, Groarke does not need to claim that the only good arguments 
are deductively valid. There might be a spectrum of logical strength among different 
invalid premise-conclusion connections and we can evaluate these different connections 
through deductive reconstruction. Taking this approach would provide a response to the 
Stove/Govier criticism and the criticism from Johnson’s fourth adequacy condition. But 
it seems to my mind that Groarke would then have to abandon the view that all good 
arguments are deductively valid and admit that some invalid arguments can be better than 
some other invalid arguments. Hence, he would have to abandon strong normative 
deductivism—the view that “all good arguments are deductively valid” (Groarke 1992: p. 
111)—even as a justification for reconstructive deductivism. Strong normative 
deductivism would not permit that there are different degrees of strength among invalid 
arguments, which there do seem to be, as Johnson, Govier, and Stove have pointed out.
This criticism of Johnson, Govier and Stove seems to be strong criticism against 
Groarke’s early versions of reconstructive deductivism, although it is not one to which 
Groarke has no response, and it is not the final word on deductivism. In the next chapter 
I will develop some of my own criticisms of deductivism by challenging the different 
justificatory strategies that can be used to support deductivism.
We can, therefore, conclude that reconstructive deductivism can, in theory, 
accommodate Johnson’s criticism from the fourth adequacy condition, although it does
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raise some serious questions about strong normative deductivism and the normative 
justification for reconstructive deductivism.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I examined some of the criticisms of deductivism which have been 
raised in the informal logic literature. In particular I looked at Govier’s and Johnson’s 
criticisms. Govier’s criticisms were threefold: (1) deductivism places “too much 
emphasis on deductive validity, failing to allow for different degrees of logical support” 
(2) deductivism “eliminates all talk of fallacies,” and (3) deductivism “leaves us with the 
insurmountable task of providing a plausible policy for reconstructing arguments which 
are on the face of it, deductively invalid” (Groarke 1992: p. 114-115). We saw that 
deductivism can in principle address (2) although this requires further development. Also 
we saw that (3) is directed at reconstructive deductivism and could pose some serious 
challenges for it, although Govier’s lens analogy and the claim that reconstructing 
arguments as deductively valid can distort them requires further elaboration. I plan to 
further explore this point in the next chapter. We also saw that criticism (1) and 
Johnson’s charge that deductivism cannot meet the fourth adequacy condition poses some 
serious challenges for strong normative deductivism and that, in so far as Groarke’s 
reconstructive deductivism depends upon a strong normative thesis, it would be undercut 
by this criticism. Although, Groarke’s view, as we saw, need not rely on strong 
normative deductivism, so a reconstructive deductivist has ways of responding to this 
criticism. Johnson makes a strong case that FDL cannot satisfy adequacy conditions
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three, four, and six, but a fully developed version of reconstructive deductivism could, in 
principle, respond to these charges.
Therefore, while Govier and Johnson have raised some challenges for a 
deductivist theory of inferential adequacy, these challenges can, in principle, be met by 
reconstructive deductivism. In the next chapter I am going to expand on some of these 
criticisms and raise some of my own to show why I think there is good reason to be 
skeptical about the prospects of a normative deductivist or a reconstructive deductivist 
theory of inferential adequacy.
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CHAPTER IV 
DEDUCTIVISM: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
4.1 Overview
In Chapter II, I examined Groarke’s reconstructive deductivism and argued that 
Groarke employs psychological, normative, and pragmatic justificatory strategies for his 
brand of reconstructive deductivism. In the last chapter I examined the debate on 
deductivism in the informal logic literature. I considered Govier’s and Johnson’s 
criticisms of deductivism. In this section I am going to develop my own criticisms of 
reconstructive deductivism and strong normative deductivism. I will also evaluate the 
possibilities for weak normative deductivism. In addition I point out how the criticisms 
raised in this section apply to Groarke’s arguments for reconstructive deductivism. It will 
turn out that while I do not have any knock down arguments against reconstructive 
deductivism, there are good reasons to be skeptical about its prospects as a theory of 
inferential adequacy. I develop my criticisms through sequentially evaluating the four 
justificatory strategies discussed in chapter one.
4.2 Introduction
I want to begin by recognizing what I consider the healthy philosophical instinct 
that motivates deductivism. The aim to come up with one unifying method of evaluation 
that can be easily applied to all arguments appears to me a sensible aim. In fact, in many 
ways, it seems to me that deductivism is a natural and reasonable starting point for the
- 90-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
project of articulating a theory of inferential adequacy. It would be an ideal situation for 
argument evaluation if there were one simple heuristic that could be applied to all 
arguments in order to determine if they are good or not. Reconstructive deductivism is a 
natural candidate for such a theory of inference adequacy. However, as the history of 
intellectual investigation and discovery testifies, the most natural candidates for a 
successful theoretical account of some phenomena must often be abandoned in the face 
of defeating evidence. I will make the case that both reconstructive and strong normative 
deductivism cannot adequately account for the relevant evidence for which a theory of 
inferential adequacy needs to account. For each justificatory strategy for reconstructive 
and for strong normative deductivism, there are reasons that should lead us to doubt 
whether these justifications actually do the work of justifying deductivism. It must be 
noted that the arguments that are developed here will not refute deductivism. After all, 
the deductivist may come up with additional methods for justifying deductivism. 
However, they will pose some challenges that, in my mind, place the burden of proof on 
deductivism.
I will make my case by developing criticisms about each justificatory strategy.
The criticism will draw attention to facts about arguers and arguments that are difficult 
for a reconstructive or a strong normative deductivist to account for on their view. I 
begin with the ontological and psychological justification and show that these 
justifications run into difficulties because arguers often explicitly disavow any 
commitment to or belief that their conclusion is entailed by their premises. Also I 
develop a criticism of what I take to be a variation of the psychological justification used 
by Groarke. Next, I move on to the normative justification for reconstructive
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deductivism and show some of the problems it faces. I then move to the pragmatic 
justificatory strategy—which seems to offer the most plausible defense of reconstructive 
deductivism—and show that it runs into problems capturing defeasible inferences. 
Defeasible arguments appear to satisfy all the conditions of Groarke’s deductivist 
strategy, although they are not deductively valid because their conclusions can be 
unacceptable/false when all of their premises are acceptable/true. Moreover, evaluating 
defeasible arguments as deductively valid distorts the nature of these arguments because 
it treats them as “certainty preserving” (Groarke 1999: p. 3) when they are not.
Defeasible arguments, therefore, need to be evaluated not through reconstructing them as 
deductively valid, but according to some other evaluative strategy. This consequence 
would suggest that there is a necessity to introduce non-deductive evaluative strategies 
into a theory of inferential adequacy. Because such a necessity exists for the use of non- 
deductive evaluative strategies, the pragmatic efficacy of reconstructive deductivism is 
called into question. Finally, I will show why I think strong normative deductivism is 
implausible and then I will go on to assess the merits and drawbacks of weak normative 
deductivism.
4.3 The Psychological and Ontological Justification
The psychological justification invokes psychological states like beliefs and/or 
intentions to justify reconstructive and strong normative deductivism. The (weak) 
psychological justification for reconstmctive deductivism claims that because arguers 
have beliefs and intentions that indicate that their arguments are attempts at valid 
arguments, they should be reconstructed as deductively valid. To fail to so reconstruct
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arguments would be uncharitable to the arguer. The psychological justification for 
normative deductivism claims that an invalid argument is a failure since it does not 
include all the relevant beliefs which would make it deductively valid and it is, therefore, 
dismissed. The strong normative deductivist claims that all good arguments are 
deductively valid. A strong normative deductivist, as we saw in chapter I, could use 
psychological considerations in an effort to justify strong normative deductivism. The 
strong normative deductivist using the psychological justification is committed to the 
view that all arguers have beliefs and intentions that indicate that their arguments are 
deductively valid. Unlike the reconstructive deductivist using the psychological 
justification, however, the psychological normative deductivist claims that we ought not 
to reconstruct the argument but simply dismiss it as a bad argument until the arguer has 
included his valid-making beliefs as premises.
The strong normative deductivist could claim that we have no idea what beliefs 
the arguer has that would make their argument deductively valid, so instead of arbitrarily 
attributing beliefs to an arguer, we ought to recognize that arguers have an obligation to 
include in their arguments all their valid- making beliefs. When arguers have failed in 
this obligation we can consider their arguments bad. Even given that there is a 
deductively valid version of the argument in mind, the strong normative deductivist 
recognizes that we are at a loss to determine what beliefs the arguer had in mind that 
would make the argument deductively valid. As a result, the strong normative 
deductivist would dismiss the argument as failing in its obligation to include all the 
relevant beliefs and consider the argument a bad one until the arguer has supplied all their 
valid-making beliefs.
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One way to understand strong normative deductivism is as a policy. The strong 
normative deductivist has a policy to dismiss all invalid arguments as bad. Invoking the 
psychological view that all arguments attempt to attain the deductive standard of 
evidence might provide a reason for this policy. If the psychological view were true, then 
one could, instead of adopting a reconstructive strategy, adopt a strong normative policy 
where attempts at valid arguments are treated as bad arguments because they did not 
achieve their goal. At first glance there is no problem here with the strong normative 
position. People often invoke empirical claims as reasons for endorsing a normative 
policy. Consider a politician who decides that the American health care system ought to 
become more like Canada’s because of certain empirically observable deficits in the 
quality of care that can be offered within the American system. The empirical evidence 
becomes a reason for them to adopt a normative policy towards the health care system in 
the United States. Similarly, the empirical claim that arguers aim for deductively validity 
could, perhaps, give someone a reason to think that arguments which are not deductively 
valid ought not to be considered good arguments.
The ontological justification for reconstructive and strong normative deductivism 
claims that all arguments are deductively valid in virtue of their ontological 
characteristics. One version of this view would be Platonic ontological deductivism.
Like the psychological justification, the ontological justification can be used to justify 
both reconstructive and strong normative deductivism. For reconstructive deductivism 
the ontological justification claims that texts which do not entail their conclusions but are 
presented in discourse as arguments should be reconstructed to express a deductively 
valid argument. The ontological justification for normative deductivism would claim that
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texts which are not deductively valid fail to denote any argument. The normative 
deductivist might say that there are several possible arguments that the text could be 
reconstructed to express and it is the obligation of the arguer to choose one, but until they 
have done that the text presented is not an argument.
The most straightforward problem that the psychological and ontological 
justifications face is that much discourse and text that we, as well as the arguers 
advancing them, would call arguments are not deductively valid. In fact many invalid 
arguments are consciously advanced by arguers as deductively invalid arguments. Many 
of these arguments seem cogent in spite of their being invalid. In English, at least, the 
linguistic consensus is that an argument is a spoken or written text where one segment of 
that text is supported by reasons which make up the rest of the text. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines the sense of argument that is relevant in logic in the following way: “a 
set of reasons given in support of something” (OED 2005: p. 41). Recall Copi’s 
definition of argument discussed in Chapter I. Copi says, “an argument. . .  is any group 
of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as 
providing support or grounds for the truth of that one” (Copi 1978: p. 7). This 
understanding of the term ‘argument’ seems to be the standard way that the word is used 
(unless it is used to refer to a quarrel). The deductivist who adopts a psychological or 
ontological justification for their deductivism presses for a much narrower definition of 
‘argument’ than the standard definition. For such deductivists all arguments are 
deductively valid. Therefore, according to them, inductive or abductive arguments used 
in science are, in fact, deductively valid. These arguments are valid because of the 
ontological or psychological characteristics which the ontological or psychological
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deductivist would think that arguments have. Moreover, every political argument that 
has ever been made and will ever be made, every practical argument about what to do 
that you or anyone else has considered, is a deductively valid argument. Indeed, every 
argument made would have been deductively valid.
This universal claim to deductive validity made by the deductivist using a 
psychological or ontological approach seems highly implausible. It seems at least as if 
there are many claims-reason complexes that are not deductively valid. The ontological 
and psycho logical justifications have to explain away the apparently straightforward fact 
that many arguments appear not to be deductively valid. And, perhaps more importantly, 
they also have to account for why people who make transparently non-deductive 
arguments are not aware of having any beliefs or intentions that suggest their argument is 
deductively valid. There are many scientific arguments where those who advance them 
are very careful to state that their conclusion does not deductively follow from their 
premises. A deductivist using the psychological or ontological justification needs to 
provide an account of how such scientists, as well as others who disavow that their 
conclusion must follow deductively, are mistaken about the nature of their arguments.
This is not a conclusive case against deductivism. But these considerations do 
show that the deductivists using a psychological or ontological justification must claim 
that such intentionally non-deductive arguments are really deductively valid. Arguers 
who explicitly disavow the entailment of their conclusion are mistaken according to such 
deductivists. Such arguers are either not making arguments, or they are making 
arguments that are implicitly deductively valid or serve to denote a (valid) argument.
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The reconstructive or normative deductivist who uses an ontological or 
psychological justificatory strategy must come up with some sort of explanation for why 
cases of arguments where the arguer explicitly disavows entailment are, in fact, cases of 
entailment. Such an explanation is not a priori impossible. Several options are open to 
the ontological or psychological deductivist. Someone invoking the ontological 
justification for reconstructive or normative deductivism would have to make a case for 
the ontological deductivist theory that arguments are real, in the Platonic sense, and 
deductively valid. I am not aware of any such case having been made, so the burden of 
proof lies with the ontological deductivist to make the case for their view. A 
reconstructive deductivist using the psychological justification might invoke empirical 
facts about cognition to illustrate that all arguments aim for deductive validity, even those 
arguments where the arguer explicitly disavows that their conclusion is meant to be 
entailed by their premises. The psychological view would claim that these empirical 
facts give us evidence to reconstruct invalid arguments so that they are deductively valid.
In giving a general overview of the different views in psychology and philosophy 
about the extent to which deductive reasoning plays a role in cognition, Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne explain one of these views as following:
.. . logical error is impossible: deduction depends on a set of universal 
principles applying to any content, and everyone exercises these principles 
infallibly. . . . What seems to be an invalid inference is nothing more than 
a valid inference from other premises. In recent years . . . [there have been 
psychologists that have defended] a similar view. Mistakes in reasoning
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[they claim] occur because people forget the premises, re-interpret them, 
or import extraneous material. [Some philosophers have] concurred, there 
is some malfunction of an information-processing mechanism. (Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne 1991: p. 18)
Reconstructive or normative deductivists could invoke psychological theories such as 
those discussed in the above passage as justification for their respective versions of 
deductivism. However, the evidence for such views is not conclusive (Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne 1991: p. 18- 22) and there are disagreements among psychologists and 
philosophers about the extent to which human reasoning is deductive. Because these 
views “seem so contrary to common sense” (Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991: P. 18), and 
because they would require a re-working of the standard conception of ‘argument’ so that 
‘argument’ would become equated with ‘deductively valid argument’, the burden of 
proof is squarely on the psychological deductivist who would advance these views to 
produce compelling evidence that they are correct. Until such evidence has been 
provided we may remain skeptical about the prospects that such evidence will provide a 
psychological justification for deductivism.
However, empirical proof is not the only option open for a psychological 
justification of deductivism. As we saw in the previous chapter, Groarke makes an 
argument for reconstructive deductivism which I think can be interpreted as a type of 
psychological justification. It justifies reconstructive deductivism though a conceptual 
analysis of the beliefs involved in every argument. More importantly, however,
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Groarke’s psychological justification for reconstructive deductivism is consistent with 
arguers not understanding their arguments to be deductively valid.
To briefly review, I think Groarke’s “psychological” justification is captured in 
the following quotation:
We can see that it is always possible to deductively reconstruct an 
argument which is not transparently deductive by noting that any arguer 
is committed to the statement that ‘If the premises of my argument are 
true, then the conclusion is true.’ This follows directly from the 
implications of the speech acts ‘argument’ and ‘assertion’ for an arguer 
who argues for some conclusion C on the basis of some set of premises 
purports to believe both that C is true and that her proposed premises 
justify this belief. ... In this sense, their argument declares that they 
believe that these premises imply the conclusion, and that the conclusion 
is true if the premises are true. It is perhaps worth noting that they are 
committed to the latter conditional not merely in the sense of material 
implication, but in the stronger sense that they must believe that there is 
a relationship between their premises and conclusion which makes it 
reasonable to base a belief in the latter on a belief in the former.
(Groarke 1999: pp. 6-7; bold added)2
^  Groarke thinks this view  is consistent with and supported by the view s expressed by van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst, 1992 pp. 30-31.
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This quotation can be interpreted as a psychological justification because it attributes 
beliefs to arguers based on a conceptual analysis of the speech act ‘argument’ and 
‘assertion’. While this can also be considered a conceptual justification for 
reconstructive deductivism, I think we can nevertheless include it as version of the 
psychological justification for reconstructive deductivism. It would be awkward to 
introduce a new justificatory strategy for deductivism called the conceptual justificatory 
strategy because conceptual justifications could make ontological or normative claims in 
addition to psychological ones. This quotation is a instance of the psychological method 
of justification for reconstructive deductivism because it is a conceptual analysis of 
speech acts ‘argument’ and ‘assertion’ which leads us to attribute beliefs (a type of 
mental state) to arguers. The beliefs we attribute to arguers based on this conceptual 
analysis give us a reason to reconstruct their arguments so that they are deductively valid. 
Contrary to the empirically based psychological justification for reconstructive 
deductivism—which uses scientific evidence based on experimentation (a posteriori 
evidence)— Groarke is doing a conceptual analysis of the concept ‘argument’ which 
makes psychological claims to justify reconstructive deductivism. Both versions of the 
psychological justification make claims about an arguer’s mental states and, therefore, 
are in a broad sense. These mental states are understood as justifying an interpretation of 
the argument such that it is deductively valid. However, they take different approaches to 
establishing these claims. One takes the approach of accumulating evidence through 
doing science; the other performs a conceptual analysis.
It is important to properly understand Groarke’s claim here. Groarke is not 
claiming that arguers intend to make deductively valid arguments, but that they can be
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understood as making deductively valid arguments. He argues that they can be so 
understood in part because of the beliefs to which an arguer is committed: beliefs that we 
know every arguer must have in virtue of their advancing an argument. An arguer is 
then, committed to a belief in the argument’s associated-conditional. If an arguer had no 
commitment to a belief in the truth of the associated-conditional, then she could not be 
understood as justifying the conclusion of their argument. This commitment to a belief in 
the associated-conditional, which every arguer must have as a condition of them making 
an argument justifies an interpreter of an argument to reconstruct it so that it is 
deductively valid.
Groarke makes it clear that his version of deductivism is not based on an analysis 
of the particular conception of logical implication that arguers have. An arguer might 
intend her argument to support their conclusion in a variety of ways. Groarke is 
advancing the view that all arguers can be understood to be making deductively valid 
arguments and that their arguments may be evaluated as such. Groarke claims that, 
“Ordinary reasoners do not distinguish the kinds of argument and persuasion which 
argumentation theory proposes as fundamentally different kinds o f argument” (Groarke 
year 1999: p. 36). Deductivism, thus, is understood by Groarke as view about how 
arguments are to be best understood, not about the actual reasoning patterns of arguers. 
One of the methods by which he justifies understanding arguments as deductively valid is 
through the conceptual analysis of ‘argument’ and ‘assertion’ which commits every 
arguer to the belief in the truth of their arguments associated conditionals.
In the quotation from page 89, Groarke makes the claim that every argument is 
justifiably interpreted as a deductively valid argument, in part, because of the beliefs that
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arguers have about the relationship that holds between their argument’s premises and its 
conclusion. Every argument has a rational structure such that its premises support its 
conclusion by functioning as reasons for the conclusions endorsement. In the above 
quotation, I take Groarke to be claiming that any rational structure can be articulated by a 
deductively valid argument because every arguer must believe that their premises provide 
reasons to endorse the conclusion; that is, every arguer believes, ‘if  the premises of my 
argument are true, the conclusion is true. ’ Based on this belief, Groarke thinks that all 
arguments can be reconstructed as deductively valid.
This analysis gives Groarke a response to the problem that we saw psychological 
justifications for reconstructive deductivism run into. The problem was that many 
arguers explicitly disavow that their premises entail their conclusion. But on this 
justification that Groarke uses for reconstructive deductivism, arguers who do not have 
any special intention to make their argument deductively valid can be understood as 
implicitly making deductively valid arguments because of the arguer’s implicit belief in 
the truth of their argument’s associated conditional.
The argument, Groarke would say, can be captured by a deductively valid 
reconstruction because it has a rational structure. Any claim-reasons complex can be 
captured in a deductively valid reconstruction by making a conditional statement where 
the reasons are the antecedent and the conclusion is the consequent of the conditional. 
Because every argument has such a structure, and because every arguer sincerely 
advancing an argument must believe that ‘if the premises of my argument are true, then 
my conclusion is true,’ a deductively valid understanding of an arguer’s arguments is 
always possible. So, while the arguer may go to all sorts of lengths to disavow
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entailment, it still seems that there is an interpretation of their argument that makes it out 
to be an entailment and is also consistent with what the arguer believes.
The problem that I find in Groarke’s claim is that attributing assumptions that 
make arguments deductively valid need not follow—even though it can—from the 
requirement that an arguer must “believe that there is a relationship between their 
premises and conclusion which makes it reasonable to base a belief in the latter on a 
belief in the former” (Groarke 1999: p. 7). All that follows is that assumptions are 
attributed to the argument that makes it reasonable to endorse the argument’s conclusion 
on the grounds of its premises. Thus, arguers—instead of being understood as having an 
implicit commitment to their argument’s associated-conditional— are more accurately 
understood as holding the commitment that ‘my conclusion follows from my premises’ 
where the term ‘follows’ is broadly construed and need not be limited to entailment. 
From the requirement that an arguer believes their premises give reasons that justify the 
endorsement of their argument’s conclusion, all that follows is the obligation to 
reconstruct the argument so that the conclusion is sufficiently supported by the premises. 
There is no need for us to reconstruct the argument as deductively valid unless we have 
some additional reasons to do so. Certainly, arguers believe that they are giving reasons 
which entitle them, and others, to endorse the conclusion of their arguments; that arguers 
have these beliefs is a necessary condition for them to be making an argument. It would, 
therefore, seem that interpreters of arguments are obliged to reconstruct arguments such 
that the premises provide adequate justification for the conclusion, but adequate 
justification need not be deductively valid justification.
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This point is nicely illustrated by Marcello Guarini’s proposed method for 
reconstructing analogical arguments where “an important property of [the] . . 
.reconstruction is that the [premises] do not entail [the conclusion]” (Guarini 2004: pp. 
161). Guarini’s reconstructive strategy goes as follows:
1. a has features fi, f 2, ■■■fn
2. b has features f j , f 2,—fn
3. Hence, a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with 
respect to features
Imagine the following situation where the friend of a young boy named Charles is upset 
that a girl named Jessica was allowed on the ride when Charles was not. The friend of 
Charles might advance an analogy like the following:
1. Jessica is 5 foot 3 inches and she was allowed on the rollercoaster.
2. Charles should be treated in the same way as Jessica with respect to
being allowed on the rollercoaster.
To evaluate this argument we would not, or for that matter need not, make this argument 
deductively valid. We would, following Guarini’s reconstructive strategy, add the 
following premise:
li. Charles is 5 foot 3 inches or taller.
We would then have an argument that provides sufficient justification for the conclusion, 
but is not deductively valid. This argument has the assumption (li) which is needed in 
order for the premises to provide sufficient reason for the endorsement of the conclusion,
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but this needed assumption does not make the argument into a deductively valid 
argument. There is no need to add assumptions to this argument that make the argument 
deductively valid in order for the premises to justify the conclusion. We can see that 
because arguers must believe that the conclusions of their arguments follow from their 
premises does not mean that all arguments should be reconstructed as deductively valid. 
There may be other possible reconstructions that do the trick just as well as a deductive 
reconstruction. All that follows from the belief that the conclusion follows from the 
premises is that there is reason to reconstruct arguments such that their premises provide 
sufficient justification for their conclusion, where sufficient justification need not be 
understood as deductively valid justification.
Contrary to Groarke’s claim, we are not especially warranted in reconstructing the 
rollercoaster analogy as deductively valid just because the argument has a rational 
structure such that the premises give reasons for the conclusion. Certainly a deductively 
valid reconstruction is possible, but so are many other potential reconstructive strategies. 
Because every argument has an associated-conditional, we do not get any closer to 
deductivism and, therefore, the logical-minimum does not constitute a reason for 
reconstructive deductivism. All that it shows us is that arguments must be understood as 
having a premise-conclusion structure such that their conclusion follows from their 
premises, where the sense of “follows” is weaker than entailment and includes structures 
of rational support that are not deductively valid (such as Guarini’s suggested scheme for 
reconstructing analogical arguments).
Suppose a reconstructive deductivist wanted to make a case against Guarini’s 
scheme for reconstructing analogical arguments. Here is one way that such a case might
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be made. The deductivist could assert that what gives the rollercoaster analogy its logical 
force is its underlying deductive structure. A reconstructive deductivist might engage us 
in Socratic dialogue in an effort to expose the underlying logical principles and beliefs 
which would make the argument deductively valid. Consider the following dialogue:
Deductivist: Was it Jessica’s being 5’3” or her pigtails that allowed her to
ride the rollercoaster?
Us: It was her being 5’3”.
Deductivist: So having the property of being 5’3” or taller is sufficient for
riding the rollercoaster?
Us: Just so.
Deductivist: And is Charles not 5’3” or taller, or were you lying earlier?
Us: He is
Deductivist: Well, then it would follow deductively from what you believe
that Charles and Jessica should both be allowed to ride the rollercoaster.3
Moreover, the deductivist might press the point even further and claim that there is 
nothing rationally forcing us to treat Jessica and Charles in the same respect unless the 
principle “being 5’3” is sufficient for riding the rollercoaster” is a premise of our 
argument. Not only do we believe in the truth of a valid-making principle, but should 
that principle not be underlying our argument, then someone might always pose the 
question—why should Jessica and Charles not be treated similarly?
3 This is an adapted version o f  a dialogue Christopher Viger developed in a commentary to an earlier version o f  
this chapter presented at the Canadian Philosophy Association, 2007. W hile in the commentary Viger is clear 
that he disagrees with deductivism, and agrees with the general points made about psychological deductivism, 
he does see this line o f  thought as one way a deductivist might respond to some o f  the arguments raised in this 
section (Viger 2007: p. 3).
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The problem with this response, I think, is that it does not recognize the defeasible 
character of the above analogical argument. In other words, it adopts a principle that is 
treated as being sufficient, when the principle that underlies this argument is not 
sufficient, but can be defeated. I understand the above argument to be defeasible. If it is 
discovered, for instance, that Charles is a notorious rollercoaster hooligan who frequently 
breaks the rules o f the ride, then there exists a defeater for the argument. Similarly, if 
Charles is in a wheelchair, or if the rollercoaster is full, there would also be defeaters for 
the rollercoaster analogy. The principle underlying this argument would therefore, be 
defeasible and, thus, the argument would not be deductively valid based on an underlying 
principle of this sort.
A defeasible argument cannot be deductively valid because the truth status of its 
premises does not transfer with necessity to its conclusion. In a defeasible argument, the 
premises can be true, or acceptable, and the conclusion false or unacceptable. In this 
sense the inference to the conclusion is not a deductively valid inference in a defeasible 
argument. In defeasible arguments the conclusion can follow from its premises without 
its following necessarily. Given that it is entirely possible that an arguer could be aware 
of the defeasible character of their argument, they would not believe that “if their 
premises are true, then the conclusion is true,” (Groarke, 1999: p. 6) because the premises 
of an argument that is defeasible can be true while the conclusion is false. However, 
because there is the potential for the conclusion to be false even when the premises are 
true does not suggest that the premises provide no reason to endorse the conclusion.
There will be more to say about defeasibility later in this chapter.
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Given the defeasible nature of many arguments, and given that arguers who 
explicitly disavow the entailment of their conclusion could very well be considering their 
premises to provide defeasible support for their conclusion, it seems likely that not all 
arguers believe that their conclusion follows from their premises necessarily.
We may conclude that Groarke’s claim that we are warranted in reconstructing 
arguments as deductively valid because every argument has an associated-conditional in 
whose truth the arguer believes is false. We do not have any such warrant. Groarke’s 
claim is false because there are non-deductive relationships between premises and 
conclusions such that the conclusions follow from premises without being entailed by 
them. Moreover, an arguer can have the belief that their conclusion follows from its 
premises without its being entailed by them. For sure, an arguer must have the belief that 
their argument’s conclusion follows from their premises. But this belief offers just as 
much warrant to develop a reconstructive scheme in which the conclusion follows from 
the premises without being entailed by them as it does for us to reconstruct the argument 
as deductively valid. Therefore, because arguers must believe that ‘my conclusion 
follows from my premises’ does not justify reconstructive deductivism and, therefore, 
does not constitute a reason for reconstructive deductivism. This belief is just as much 
reason for any other reconstructive scheme that provides sufficient support for a 
conclusion as it is for reconstructive deductivism.
Therefore, Groarke’s justification for reconstructive deductivism based on 
psychological considerations does not succeed. The claim that every arguer believes in 
an implicit conditional statement does not justify reconstructive deductivism. All that it 
would justify is that the arguer believes that their conclusion follows from their premises.
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And it is possible for this belief to occur outside the framework of an argument that is 
deductively valid.
In this section we have looked at some evidence that raises doubts about the 
success of the ontological and psychological justificatory strategies for reconstructive and 
strong normative deductivism. For the ontological justification we saw that many 
arguments are made where the arguer explicitly disavows that their conclusion is entailed 
by their premises. So the ontological deductivist needs to come up with a story for why 
we should think that texts that are explicitly designed not to entail their conclusion are, in 
fact, not arguments when they seem to satisfy the definition of the term ‘argument’. This 
is not an inconceivable task, however, the burden of proof is on the ontological and 
psychological deductivist. Why should we think that all arguments are deductively valid 
when people advance deductively invalid claim-reasons complexes that satisfy the 
dictionary definition of ‘argument’?
The psychological justification for reconstructive deductivism strikes me as 
having more promise. The psychological justification still has to, however, as we saw, 
provide an account for why arguers who explicitly disavow that some of their arguments 
do not entail their conclusions were wrong and that, in fact, these arguments do entail 
their conclusion. There are at least two ways that the psychological reconstructive 
deductivist might accomplish this task: (1) she might base her claim on empirical 
evidence about cognition (she might claim something like our reasoning functions 
according to the rules of deductive logic), and (2) she could provide an a priori reason 
based on what arguers must believe and be committed to in order to make an argument at 
all such that those commitments warrant us to reconstruct arguments as deductively valid.
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As with the ontological justification, in using (1) the burden of proof is on the 
deductivist. Given that the definition of argument accommodates non-entailing claims- 
reason complexes and that arguers often explicitly disavow entailment, without strong 
psychological evidence that such arguments are attempts at making deductively valid 
arguments, we do not have any reason to change our view that there are deductively 
invalid arguments. Groarke’s psychological justification takes option (2). The problem 
that we saw with this justification is that it makes the claim that we are warranted in 
understanding transparently invalid arguments as valid ones because of the belief that 
every arguer has that their conclusions follows from their premises. This claim does not 
justify reconstructive deductivism any more than any other reconstructive strategy where 
the conclusion follows from the premises.
Given that Groarke’s psychological justification for reconstructive deductivism 
does not succeed, and, given that, the burden of proof is on the reconstructive deductivist 
who would give an alternative account of the psychological or ontological justification, it 
is reasonable to be skeptical of the prospects for reconstructive deductivism on 
ontological or psychological justificatory strategies. The reconstructive deductivist must, 
therefore, shift to one of the other justificatory strategies, or come up with more evidence, 
if she is going to adequately justify reconstructive deductivism. They are also left with 
the option of adopting a different form of deductivism, like strong or weak normative 
deductivism.
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4.4 The Normative Justification
As discussed in Chapter II, there is an interpretation of the quotation from 
Groarke discussed above (Groarke 1999: pp. 6-7, p. 97 above) which understands the 
quotation as a normative justification for reconstructive deductivism. We will have to 
investigate too see if this interpretation of the above quotation makes a better case for 
reconstructive deductivism than the psychological interpretation of it. The normative 
interpretation of this quotation places a standard on justification such that a conclusion 
cannot be said to be justified by its premises and, hence, cannot really be the product of 
an argument, if the argument cannot be understood as deductively valid. An argument, in 
virtue of its being a claim-reasons complex must be, at least implicitly, deductively valid. 
Validity is built into the very concept of argument on this reading. Therefore all 
arguments would be deductively valid. Any piece of discourse that purports to be an 
argument can be understood as deductively valid and in turn, when it is not already 
deductively valid, ought to be turned into a deductively valid argument by adding a 
premise which it requires to make its validity transparent. The normative interpretation 
of this quotation need not emphasize the arguer’s beliefs. All this interpretation needs to 
claim is that all arguments are, in principle, linguistic complexes that are deductively 
valid. According then to the very conception of what an argument is—on the very 
standard placed on something that justifies or attempts to justify a conclusion with 
reasons—we attribute an underlying deductively valid structure to it. The normative 
justification for reconstructive deductivism states that any reason for some claim must 
entail the claim. If the reason does not entail the claim, then it cannot be considered a
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reason for it. Hence, when an argument does not transparently entail its conclusion, then 
the argument can be reconstructed and evaluated by identifying a valid-making premise.
The notion, however, that an argument is by definition something that is 
deductively valid can be challenged on similar grounds that the psychological 
justification for reconstructive deductivism was challenged. For simply because you can 
understand an argument as containing the idea that ‘the conclusion follows from the 
premises’ does not mean that the argument is deductively valid: in other words, the 
standard of justification is not deductive validity but rational support. There seem to be 
many senses in which something can be a reason for a claim without entailing it. It is 
true that in inductive, or conductive forms of argument we can say that ‘the conclusion of 
the argument follows from the arguments premises’ and thus, in a sense, claim that ‘if the 
premises, then the conclusion’, but in these arguments this does not mean that the 
conclusion is entailed by the premises. There are many argument structures that satisfy 
the requirement of providing reasons for a conclusion without being deductively valid. 
Recall, once again, Copi’s definition of argument and its distinction from a deductively 
valid argument. For Copi, “an argument. . .is any group of propositions of which one is 
claimed to follow the others, which are regarded as providing support or grounds for the 
truth of that one” (Copi 1978: p. 7). And it is, “only a deductive argument involves the 
claim that its conclusion provides conclusive grounds” for its conclusion, where 
providing conclusive grounds means the argument is deductively valid; that is to say, “its 
premises and conclusion are so related that it is absolutely impossible for the premises to 
be true unless the conclusion is true also” (Copi 1978: p. 32). The first concept, 
‘argument’, is broader then the concept of ‘valid.’ Because the concept ‘argument’ is
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broader than the concept of ‘validity’ there are other ways that a conclusion can follow 
from premises without being entailed by them. The multiplicity of potential rational 
structures from which a claim can be said to follow from reasons suggests that the 
structure of deductive validity is one structure among several that capture the relationship 
of rational consequence expressed within arguments. To my mind this is reason to 
question the claim that all good arguments must be deductively valid.
Groarke thinks that because every argument presumes the truth of its associated 
conditional, all arguments are implicitly deductively valid. But I think all that arguments 
presume is that their conclusion follows their premises. There is a plurality of ways that 
this is possible, so there would be a plurality of ways that a conclusion could follow from 
its premises.
Govier has a nice way of making this point. Govier critiques this deductivist view 
by stating that arguments can have different types of support relationships between their 
premises and conclusion. If an argument takes the general form PI; P2; P3; PI, P 2 ,. . . ,  
Pn then C; C, there are many different ways that the conclusion could follow from the 
premises. Here are some of the ways that Govier (1999: pp. 116-117) mentions:
1. PI -Pn ensure that C is true.
2. Pl-Pn entail that C is true.
3. Pl-Pn support C.
4. Pl-Pn give good grounds for C.
5. Pl-Pn give evidence for C
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Why, as Groarke insists, do arguments need to be understood such that their premises 
entail their conclusion? Groarke’s response would be that the different premise- 
conclusion relationships in the above list can be captured within deductively valid 
arguments. He might use an example like the following:
1. A gives evidence for B
2. A
3. There is evidence for B
Deductive arguments, thinks Groarke, provide good grounds, give good evidence, and 
can capture a plurality o f different kinds of support for conclusions because, according to 
Groarke, entailment need not make a conclusion definitively true. And, since every 
arguer has the belief that, “if the premises of my argument are true, then the conclusion is 
true” we can understand arguments as exhibiting a deductively valid standard of 
evidence.
This discussion captures a central difference between Groarke’s view and that of 
my own and Govier’s. One way to understand Groarke’s point is by conceptualizing 
validity as equated with rationality. To see what I mean by this consider two of 
Groarke’s statements earlier discussed. Groarke says:
A. “In this sense, their argument declares that they believe that these premises imply
the conclusion, and that the conclusion is true if the premises are true” (Groarke
1999: p. 6) (validity).
B. It is perhaps worth noting that they are committed to this latter conditional not
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merely in the sense of material implication, but in the stronger sense that they
must believe that there is a relationship between their premises and conclusion
which makes it reasonable to base a belief in the latter on a belief in the former” 
(Groarke 1999: p. 6) (rationality).
Groarke seems to be thinking here that rationality is equivalent with validity. But,
“While the content relations in B are stronger than in A the formal structure of B need not 
be” (Viger 2007, p: 2). That is to say, the rational structure of arguments can often be 
captured through reconstructions that are not deductively valid. We can express a 
relationship of rational support in several different ways and need not be limited to 
deductive validity. Groarke seems to think that because we can express all arguments as 
deductively valid, an argument’s being deductively valid is a condition of its being 
reasonable—of its providing a reason for its conclusion. However, I think that this claim 
misses that there are many ways that a conclusion can follow from premises without 
being deductively valid. In other words, there are many rational structures that are not 
deductively valid structures. Rationality is weaker than, and not equivalent to, deductive 
validity.
But this line of criticism is nowhere near approaching conclusive. Groarke can 
simply reply that we can always express arguments as deductively valid. So Groarke, 
and Govier and myself end up in an unproductive stalemate. Groarke would insist that all 
arguments can be captured as deductively valid arguments. Govier and I would claim 
that there are deductively invalid ways of capturing a relationship of logical consequence 
so there is no need to be a deductivist.
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What I hope this line of criticism shows is that there are many possible ways for 
conclusions to follow from a set of premises. This would challenge the normative 
justification since it would give us a reason to question the claim that the normative 
standard for inferential adequacy is deductive validity. We have just as much reason to 
understand arguments according to some other deductively invalid argument structure 
that would portray a relationship of rational consequence between the premises and 
conclusion as we do to understand them as deductively valid. I think that this line of 
thought offered by Govier and myself puts pressure on the normative deductivist to 
acknowledge that there are other standards of rational support that are not deductively 
valid in structure. And, hence, this line of criticism from Govier and myself challenges 
the normative justification for reconstructive deductivism by making space for sufficient 
non-entailing claim-reasons complexes.
Groarke, however, attempts to shift the balance of considerations in favour of 
reconstructive deductivism by making the following claim: “Why follow the standard 
practice and introduce a distinct conception of inductive arguments?” (Groarke 1999, 
214). In this way, Groarke asserts that Ockham’s Razor favors reconstructive 
deductivism. Groarke’s shift of emphasis here highlights his pragmatic justificatory 
strategy. It is not because arguers beliefs warrant reconstructive deductivism, or that 
there is some normative standard on arguments that warrants reconstructing them as 
deductively valid; the strongest case that Groarke employs in favor of reconstructive 
deductivism is pragmatic. However, this justification can only succeed if reconstructive 
deductivism can be applied to all arguments. If there are arguments that warrant the use 
of some other reconstructive strategy, then the pragmatic efficacy of reconstructive
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deductivism would be called into question. The next section will consider the pragmatic 
justification and illustrate why I think it does not workA
4.5 The Pragmatic Justification
In the first chapter we saw that the pragmatic justification for reconstructive 
deductivism did not make any claims about the beliefs that arguers may or may not have, 
or about a normative standard that makes all arguments out to be deductively valid. 
Rather, the pragmatic justification for reconstructive deductivism only claims that all 
arguments that are not already transparently valid can be effectively evaluated by 
reconstmcting them as transparently deductively valid arguments. This version of 
Groarke’s defense for deductivism need not claim that reconstructive deductivism is 
warranted by being based on an arguer’s commitment to a belief in their arguments 
associated conditionals, or based on a normative standard contained in the concept of 
justification. This version of Groarke’s defense would not be affected by the criticisms 
raised in the previous section. This defense could admit that there are many different 
types of premise-conclusion connections. Where deductive validity gains its special 
status for a pragmatist about reconstructive deductivism is as a tool to evaluate arguments 
that are not transparently deductively valid. By turning deductively invalid arguments 
into arguments that are deductively valid, we are able to evaluate the deductively invalid 
arguments. These arguments might support their conclusions according to a non- 
deductive standard of evidence, but we can use reconstructive deductivism to evaluate 
them. Reconstructive deductivism could then be favored by Ockham’s Razor. Instead of
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using many different strategies to reconstruct and evaluate arguments, we can just use 
deductive reconstruction.
The natural criticism for this defense of reconstructive deductivism would be the 
existence of arguments that cannot be assessed as deductively valid arguments. I think 
that arguments with defeasible, or non-mono tonic, inferences are cases of such 
arguments. Defeasibility is a form of inferences that is by its very definition not 
deductively valid. The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy says that defeasible 
inference are:
. . .  that kind of inference of everyday life in which reasoners draw 
conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in light of 
further information. Such inferences are called non-monotonic because 
the set of conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base 
does not increase (in fact, it can shrink) with the size of knowledge base.
This is in contrast to classical (first-order) logic, whose inferences, being 
deductively valid, can never be “undone” by new information.
(Antonelli 2006: p. 1)
In other words, deductively valid arguments are monotonic because any premise that can 
be added to such arguments will not change the necessity with which the arguments 
inference to the conclusion is made. Arguments that are non-monotonic have defeasible 
inferences which can be defeated by the inclusion of additional information and are, 
therefore, not deductively valid. Consider this version of a of defeasible inference “that 
is ubiquitous in the literature” (Frankish 2005: p. 1),
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1. Most birds fly.
2. Tweety is a bird.
3. Therefore, Tweety most likely flies.
I think Groarke would say that this argument is deductively valid. While the certainty 
status of the conclusion is not guaranteed to be true the inference to the conclusion, 
according to Groarke, would transfer the certainty status of the premises over to the 
conclusion. In other words, according to Groarke, the conclusion is just as certain/true as 
the premises. Therefore, on Groarke’s view, an argument like the above is “certainty 
preserving” (Groarke 1999: p. 3), and so, in NLD, it is deductively valid. If we endorse 
the premises, then we must endorse the conclusion as well. Given that this argument’s 
inference is defeasible, however, the certainty of the premises need not be preserved in 
the inference made to the conclusion. Given that most birds fly it remains a possibility 
that some birds do not fly. Given that this is a possibility there are situations in which the 
acceptability o f the conclusion will not be guaranteed by the premise. If, for instance, 
Tweety is a penguin, or Tweety has a broken wing, or Tweety is a chick, etc., then the 
inference is not acceptable. Here is what the argument with such an unacceptable 
inference would look like in standard form.
1. Most birds fly.
2. Tweety is a bird.
3. Tweety is a penguin.
4. Therefore, Tweety most likely flies.
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But the inference is not acceptable given this additional information. Moreover, the 
premises in the above argument are all true/acceptable, but the conclusion is not. 
Therefore, for the original Tweety argument, it is possible for all the premises to be true 
and acceptable and the conclusion false/unacceptable. The inference to the conclusion 
would then not be deductively valid.
Let us look more closely at one of the examples used by Groarke to show that he 
does treat arguments, like the above, which have defeasible inferences, as deductively 
valid arguments with necessary inferences. Groarke uses the following argument as a 
deductively valid reconstruction of an inductive argument:
‘HowT is superficial and dated. ‘The Second Coming’ has profound social 
significance. A poem which has a profound social significance is a finer poem 
than one which is superficial and dated. Therefore, ‘The Second Coming’ is a 
finer poem than ‘HowT (Groarke 1999: pp. 8).
Groarke adds the premise in italics to the argument which previously did not include that 
premise and claims that the argument is now deductively valid. If the arguer has 
reservations that poems that are superficial and dated could be better than ones with 
profound social significance for technical reasons, then Groarke advocates the following 
deductively valid reconstruction:
‘Howl is superficial and dated. ‘The Second Coming’ has profound social 
significance. A poem which has profound social significance is probably a finer 
poem than one which is superficial and dated. Therefore, ‘The Second Coming’ 
is probably a finer poem than ‘HowT (Groarke 1999: pp. 8).
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However, contrary to Groarke’s claim, this argument is not deductively valid, but 
defeasible. The conclusion might be unacceptable even if the premises are acceptable.
To see that this is so, add to this argument the following two premises: “‘Howl’ is the
thmost innovative and technically sophisticated poem of the 20 Century” and “Hardly 
anyone reads ‘The Second Coming’ anymore.” With the addition of these premises, 
which are consistent with the other premises being acceptable, it would become more 
difficult to acceptably infer that “‘The Second Coming is probably a finer poem than 
‘Howl.’” In other words, the premises of the above argument could be acceptable while 
the conclusion is not acceptable and, therefore, the inference to the conclusion would not 
be certainty preserving.
I want to look carefully at how a reconstructive deductivist using the pragmatic 
justification would evaluate an argument with a defeasible inference. I think that either 
they would have to evaluate the argument as being a non-deductive, defeasible, 
argument—which would be contrary to reconstructive deductivism or they would have to 
distort the argument during reconstruction to turn it into a deductively valid argument. 
Consider the following argument:
1. Jackson is a Beatles fan.
2. Therefore, Jackson probably likes the song ‘While My Guitar Gently Weeps’. 
A reconstructive deductivist would add the premise:
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A Beatles fan probably likes the song ‘While My Guitar Gently Weeps’.
And treat the argument as deductively valid—as certainty preserving. Let’s assume that 
the premise is acceptable that a Beatles fan would probably like the song ‘While My 
Guitar Gently Weeps’. Treating this premise as acceptable, however, does not tell us the 
degree of certainty or acceptability that can be placed in the inference because the 
premise could be acceptable and the conclusion unacceptable. Even if this premise is 
thought to be unacceptable the conclusion could be acceptable. In other words, the 
acceptability of the inference might be the opposite acceptability of the premise, and thus 
evaluating the acceptability of the premise does not tell us about the acceptability of the 
inference. After all Jackson might be a Beatles fan but not a fan of George Harrison’s 
work, or perhaps Jackson never warmed to Eric Clapton’s guitar playing (who played 
guitar on the recording of that song), or, maybe Jackson has never heard that Beatles 
song. The reconstructive deductivists’ valid-making premise does not give us a reliable 
assessment of the inference to the conclusion because the premise could be completely 
acceptable when the inference can be defeated. Look back at the Tweety example for a 
moment. The valid-making premise for,
1. Tweety is a bird.
2. Therefore, Tweet most likely flies.
is as acceptable a premise as one can get. In fact, the premise is true. It is true that ‘most 
birds fly.’ However, given this high degree of acceptability in the valid-making premise 
of this argument, we cannot determine the acceptability of the inference because the 
inference can be defeated by the addition of further information (or strengthened).
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Perhaps the deductivist might go further in reconstructing this argument. The 
deductivist might add another premise to make the argument deductively valid. They 
might add a premise like:
Tweety is a typical bird.
Or for the Beatles argument,
Jackson is among most Beatles fans.
Here is an argument where Groarke adds a similar premise as part of a reconstructive 
deductivist strategy,
Ninety-six percent of adult Americans watch television more than 
ten hours per week. Davis is an adult American. Therefore, Davis 
watches television more than ten hours per week. (Groarke 1999:
p. 8)
to which Groarke adds the premise
Davis is among this ninety six percent.
In adding this premise, however, I think Groarke has changed the argument. Given that 
both ‘Davis is an adult American’ and that ‘Ninety-six percent of adult American’s watch 
television more than ten-hours per week,’ there is no need to think that Davis is part of 
this ninety-six percent. In fact, these claims leave open the possibility that Davis is not 
amongst this ninety-six percent. The claims in the original argument give us defeasible 
support to think that Davis probably watches television more than ten hours a week, but 
not deductive support. Adding the above premise is, in effect, to say that ‘Davis does 
watch television more than ten hours per week’ when that claim was not a part of the 
original argument. An interesting property of arguments that are defeasible is that their
- 123 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inferences can be strengthened or weakened by the addition of further evidence. If we 
add to this argument the premise ‘Davis is among this ninety-six percent’ then the 
argument no longer exhibits this characteristic. Instead, the claim that ‘Davis watches 
more than ten hours of television a week’ follows necessarily. No matter what 
information we add to this argument, the inference to the conclusion remains necessary.
I think that if a reconstructive deductivist makes a move like this, then she ends 
up evaluating a different argument than the one they started out evaluating. In the initial 
arguments there was no presumption that Tweety is a typical bird, that Jackson was 
among most Beatles fan, or that Davis was amongst the ninety-six percent of Americans 
who watch more than ten hours of television a week. Indeed, an important part of those 
inferences is that they are open to Tweety being an atypical bird, Jackson not being 
amongst most Beatles fans, or Davis falling into the four percent who do not watch ten 
hours of television a week. If the reconstructive deductivist makes such a move and adds 
this sort of valid-making premise to a defeasible argument, then it seems that Govier’s 
lens analogy becomes very appropriate. If we look at arguments like the Tweety 
argument, the Beatles argument, or the Davis argument, or any argument with a 
defeasible inference through the spectacles of deductive validity, then we see the 
argument through lenses that distort its logical and rational structure. Like looking at the 
world through purple lenses and seeing everything as purple we would, in evaluating 
defeasible arguments as deductively valid, have a distorted image of the way things are.
Johnson’s criticism based on the fourth adequacy condition also seems to take on 
new significance when examined in light of defeasible inferences. Treating inferences 
that can be made stronger or weaker by the addition of new information as “all or
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nothing” (Johnson 2000: p. 79) inferences seems inappropriate. Theses inferences are not 
all or nothing. It is not the case that Tweety, being the bird that she is, must most likely 
fly. Tweety’s being a bird entitles us to infer that Tweety might fly. But this is not an all 
or nothing matter. Rather the strength of defeasible inferences can alter along various 
grades of strength depending on new information. It seems inadequate to treat these 
arguments as deductively valid when the acceptability o f the conclusion follows only 
tentatively from the premises. As Frankish (2005) says of such non-monotonic 
inferences, “in contrast with deductive inference, the conclusion drawn may be 
withdrawn in the light of further information even though the original premises are 
retained” (Frankish 2005: p. 1)
I take such considerations to offer a challenge to the pragmatic justification for 
reconstructive deductivism. The pragmatic justification only works if reconstructing all 
arguments as deductively valid is a useful strategy for evaluating arguments. I contend 
that defeasible inferences cannot be usefully evaluated through reconstructing them as 
deductively valid without distorting the argument under evaluation. Rather, systems of 
non-monotonic logic are required to evaluate arguments with defeasible inferences.
The evidence that arises from defeasible inferences suggests that there is reason to 
think that not all arguments can be effectively evaluated as deductively valid arguments. 
This would then directly challenge the success of the pragmatic justification for 
reconstructive deductivism. It is possible that the reconstructive deductivist might have a 
method to evaluate defeasible arguments, however, until they demonstrate a satisfactory 
version of reconstructive deductivism that can account for defeasible inferences without
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distorting arguments then there is reason to be skeptical about the prospects for 
reconstructive deductivism even on the pragmatic justification.
4.6 Strong and Weak Normative Deductivism
Strong normative deductivism is the view that the only good arguments are 
deductively valid arguments. This position only works if we are willing to consider 
strong inductive arguments and abductive arguments, and perhaps conductive arguments, 
not to be good arguments. This seems to go contrary to some very strong intuitions we 
have about what a good argument is. Consider the following strong inductive argument:
1. John has asthma.
2. John is 90 years old.
3. John has had a hip replacement.
4. Therefore, John will not run a four-minute mile.
This example of a strong inductive argument seems to provide some compelling reasons 
for the conclusion. The standard of argument goodness used by the strong normative 
deductivist, therefore, seems unreasonable. Strong normative deductivism has the same 
problems that the normative justification for reconstructive deductivism was shown to 
have. There seems to be normative standards of inferential adequacy that are not 
deductively valid. It follows then, if we are going to develop a compelling version of 
normative deductivism, it would have to be a form of weak normative deductivism.
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As we discussed in Chapter I, however, weak normative deductivism might end 
up being a very weak version of deductivism. Consider what happens to the above 
argument when we turn it into a deductively valid argument.
1. Anyone who has asthma, is 90 years old, and has had a hip replacement will 
not run a four-minute mile.
2. John has asthma.
3. John is 90 years old.
4. John has had a hip replacement.
5. Therefore, John will not run a four minute mile.
This argument is a deductively valid version of the above inductive argument. According 
to a weak normative deductivist it is, therefore, a better argument. It is important to note, 
however, that this argument is not significantly better than the original argument. Its 
rational force is only marginally stronger than the inductive argument. Certainly the 
inference to the conclusion is necessary. And, in so far as the inference to the conclusion 
of the inductive version of the argument is not necessary, the deductively valid version of 
the argument is a better argument. However, the inference is not a significantly stronger 
inference than was the original inductive inference. If we are going to adopt a weak 
normative deductivism and admit that inductively strong arguments can have almost as 
good inferences as deductively valid arguments, we will then have a very weak version of 
deductivism indeed.
It is even reasonable to claim that a plausible version of weak normative 
deductivism that recognized that strong inductive arguments have inferences that are
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almost as good as deductively valid arguments is not properly labeled a form of 
deductivism. Rather, it seems more like a version of pluralism or perhaps some sort of 
spectrum theory about inferential strength. Technically, weak normative deductivism 
seems to have things right. It is important to acknowledge, however, that such a brand of 
deductivism could potentially admit many deductively invalid arguments into the class of 
good arguments. Indeed, many of these good arguments that are deductively invalid 
might be almost as good as deductively valid arguments, so the normative deductivism 
would be a very weak version of normative deductivism indeed.
4.7 Conclusion
We have examined the justifications for reconstructive deductivism and strong 
normative deductivism. We began with a criticism of the psychological and ontological 
justifications for reconstructive deductivism. The psychological and ontological 
justifications need to explain why many arguers explicitly disavow that their conclusion 
is entailed by their premises. I thought of two ways that the psychological reconstructive 
deductivist could explain this: 1) uncover empirical evidence about human psychology 
that says that humans always attempt to make valid arguments; or, 2) show that arguers 
have beliefs that their argument entails their conclusion based on an analysis of the 
conditions of making an argument. (1) Adopts the burden of proof because until there is 
compelling empirical evidence that indicates human psychology is such that all 
arguments are deductively valid, we should stick with the current conception of argument 
as a claim-reasons complexes which can accommodate deductively invalid arguments.
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This same point also counts against the ontological justificatory strategy. In 
critiquing that strategy, we developed a criticism of Groarke’s view that because arguers 
must believe in the truth of the associated-conditional for any argument they make, we 
can reconstruct that argument as deductively valid. We saw that there is no special 
reason to reconstruct arguments as deductively valid on the grounds that they must 
believe in their argument’s associated-conditional. All that the belief in the associated- 
conditional commits the arguer to is the view that their conclusion follows from their 
premises and there are potentially many ways in which they can do that. Therefore, 
reconstructive deductivism is not justified by Groarke’s discussion of the associated- 
conditional.
Groarke might dig his heals in at this point and highlight the normative character 
of his justification for reconstructive deductivism. He might claim that there is a 
normative standard for argument such that there can be no justification of an argument’s 
conclusion unless the conclusion is understood as being entailed by the premises. If this 
normative standard were true, then without the argument being understood as deductively 
valid its conclusion would not follow from its premises. The problem with this is that 
there are many ways that a conclusion can be rationally supported by some premises 
without those premises entailing the conclusion. Making entailment a normative standard 
is not necessary. Indeed, because every argument contains the view that “the conclusion 
follows from the premises”, and the concept ‘follows’ is generally thought of as broader 
than entailment it makes sense for there to be non-entailing ways that a conclusion can be 
justified. Here we would end up with more of stalemate, however, than a conclusive 
counter claim against the normative justification.
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Groarke attempts here to shift the balance of considerations in favour of 
reconstructive deductivism by advancing the view that it is favored by Ockham’s razor. 
This justification highlights the pragmatic usefulness of reconstructive deductivism. 
Ultimately reconstructive deductivism will fail, however, if there are arguments that 
cannot be adequately captured as deductively valid arguments. I made the case that there 
are such arguments. Examples of such arguments are arguments with defeasible 
inferences that are captured in the “family of formal frameworks” called non-monotonic 
logic (Antonelli 2006: p. 1). If a plausible version of reconstructive deductivism is to be 
advanced, then it must have a way of satisfactorily accounting for defeasible inferences 
under a deductive framework. The existence of defeasible inferences would indicate that 
there is necessity to use deductively invalid reconstructive approaches to evaluate 
arguments and, hence, reconstructive deductivism cannot rely on Ockham’s razor. The 
pragmatic effectiveness as a method for evaluating arguments would be called into 
question.
Having raised some substantial doubts for the possibility of reconstructive 
deductivism, we switched focus to strong and weak normative deductivism. I claimed 
that strong normative deductivism places an unreasonable standard on argument 
goodness. There are many very strong inductive arguments that would not be good 
arguments according to the strong normative deductivist. Treating strong inductive 
arguments, for instance, as bad arguments, however, strongly conflicts with some of our 
basic logical intuition that such arguments are good. Weak normative deductivism seems 
like a more plausible position. Weak normative deductivism, indeed, seems to have 
things largely correct. However, weak normative deductivism may be such a weak
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version of deductivism that it does not warrant consideration as being a form of 
deductivism. Even if it is granted that making a strong inductive argument deductively 
valid does make it a better argument in the sense that its conclusion would follow 
necessarily when it did not previously, it is difficult to see that this would make the 
argument inferentially better to a significant degree. This suggests that there are 
standards of goodness for inference that are very close to deductive validity. So, while 
technically weak normative deductivism may be thought of as a version of deductivism, it 
is very close to pluralism—the view that there are many different standards of evaluation 
for arguments.
I can, therefore, sum up by saying that there is reason to be skeptical about the 
prospects of reconstructive deductivism because important doubts can be raised about 
each one of its justificatory strategies and, most importantly, that there are arguments 
with defeasible inferences which cannot be evaluated through deductive reconstruction. 
Strong normative deductivism seems to have an unreasonable standard for argument 
goodness and weak normative deductivism, while apparently correct, may be a very weak 
version of deductivism since there exist strong inductive arguments that would be nearly 
as inferentially adequate as deductively valid arguments. Weak normative deductivism 
may be better understood as a variation of pluralism or spectrum theory than as a form of 
deductivism.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have sketched the conceptual terrain of deductivism in informal 
logic and argumentation theory and raised some criticisms against deductivism as a 
theory of inferential adequacy. I developed definitions for three different types of 
deductivism: strong normative deductivism, weak normative deductivism, and 
reconstructive deductivism. Some general strategies for how these different varieties of 
deductivism might be justified were also presented. These justificatory strategies were 
ontological, psychological, normative and pragmatic; the latter two can be applied to 
strong normative deductivism, and all four can be applied to reconstructive deductivism.
I applied this categorization scheme to Leo Groarke’s defense of deductivism and 
developed an interpretation of Groarke’s version of reconstructive deductivism whereby 
it was understood to employ three of these four justificatory strategies. In order to justify 
reconstructive deductivism I claimed that Groarke uses psychological, normative and 
pragmatic justificatory strategies.
Next I examined some of the criticisms of deductivism that have been raised 
within the informal logic and argumentation theory literature. I looked at Govier’s 
criticism and Groarke’s response to these criticisms. Govier developed some compelling 
criticisms against normative deductivism, but Groarke’s response developed a 
reconstructive deductivist thesis that I argued goes some way to addressing these 
criticisms. Johnson criticized FDL-deductivism on the grounds that it cannot satisfy the 
adequacy conditions that a good theory of argument ought to satisfy. While these 
criticisms are good reasons to abandon FDL as a theory of inferential adequacy, a more
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fully developed version of reconstructive deductivism—like that of Groarke’s—seems 
more resistant to the criticisms raised by Johnson.
In the final chapter of my thesis, I developed some of my own criticisms against 
strong normative deductivism and reconstructive deductivism. I pointed out some 
problems that I think arise with each of the justificatory strategies for reconstructive 
deductivism and showed how these problems apply to Groarke’s version of 
reconstructive deductivism. We saw that a psychological justificatory strategy has to 
come up with an account of why some arguers deny that they are attempting to entail 
their conclusion. The psychological reconstructive deductivist has two options:
i) come up with empirical evidence about human 
psychology that would prove that any argument is 
an attempt at a deductively valid argument.
ii) make a case that there are a priori considerations 
that establish that arguers have beliefs or intentions 
that make their argument an attempt at a valid 
argument even when they deny that their arguments 
are valid.
Option (i) places the burden of proof on the deductivist. Empirical evidence that 
establishes that all arguments are deductively valid is needed to make this case. Until 
such evidence is provided there is reason to be skeptical about the prospects for 
deductivism on this justification because it would strongly conflict with our intuition that
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we often are not trying to make deductively valid arguments. Option (ii) is the one that I 
understand Groarke to take. Groarke claims that every argument can be understood as 
deductively valid because its arguer must believe that the conclusion follows from the 
reasons used to support it. The arguer would then believe that her argument can be 
captured by a conditional statement that makes the reasons out to be the antecedent and 
the conclusion out to be the consequent. However, because an arguer thinks her 
arguments can be captured by such a conditional does not give us any more reason to 
understand the arguer as making a deductive argument than it would give us reason to 
understand an arguer as advancing some non-valid argument structure such that the claim 
follows from the reasons for it. Therefore, this does not constitute a reason for 
reconstructive deductivism any more than it would constitute a reason for some other 
reconstructive strategy.
The normative justificatory strategy holds that any reason for a claim must be 
such that it entails that claim. We may add premises to the claim-reasons complex to 
expose to expose the valid connection that exists between a claim and the reasons for it. 
However, this runs into similar problems that option (ii) for the psychological 
reconstructive deductivist did. There are many arguments that provide support that is not 
deductively valid support. The very definition of argument would suggest this. Copi’s 
definition of argument states that: “an argument. . .  is any group of propositions of which 
one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing support or 
grounds for the truth of that one” (Copi 1978: p. 7). For Copi, “only a deductive 
argument involves the claim that its conclusion provides conclusive grounds,” where 
providing conclusive grounds means the argument is deductively valid; that is to say, “its
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premises and conclusion are so related that it is absolutely impossible for the premises to 
be tme unless the conclusion is true also” (Copi 1978: p. 32). Copi’s conception of 
argument and of deductive validity articulates the standard conception of these concepts. 
An argument, or a rational claim-reasons stmcture, is weaker than deductive validity. To 
‘follow from’ need not be to ‘follow necessarily from’: a claim can follow from some 
reasons such that it is possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are tme, 
although a conclusion can also follow in a way where it is impossible for it to be false 
when the premises are true. The latter is a stronger sense of what it means for a 
conclusion to follow from some premises than the former. Hence, the concept of 
‘argument’ does not have to be equated with ‘deductively valid’ argument. Moreover, 
given that pieces of discourse that we consider arguments seem to offer non-deductive 
support for a conclusion, there is no reason to change our conception of argument to the 
more narrow conception that would identify argument with deductive validity.
Groarke, however, attempts to shift the balance in favour of reconstructive 
deductivism by invoking Ockham’s Razor. Reconstructive deductivism is an easy 
heuristic that can be applied to any argument. We need not, here, invoke normative or 
psychological considerations. Reconstructive deductivism is a useful method for 
evaluating arguments whether or not they are defined as being deductively valid or 
whether or not an arguer has beliefs that make her argument an attempt at being a 
deductively valid. However, I argued that there is a necessity to have additional, non- 
deductive, evaluative strategies. For instance, reconstructing defeasible arguments as 
deductively valid is problematic. Reconstructive deductivism is not an adequate or useful 
way to evaluate defeasible inferences, at least in its current formulation.
- 135 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
We then moved on to assess strong normative deductivism and weak normative 
deductivism. Strong normative deductivism is implausible because it makes arguments 
that have good inferences out to have bad ones. Strong inductive arguments, for instance, 
are not good according to strong normative deductivism. Weak normative deductivism 
seems to have things right. It is, however, questionable to what extent weak normative 
deductivism is a version of deductivism or a form of pluralistic or spectrum view of 
inferential adequacy.
I do not understand the line of argument developed here to be conclusive. There 
is significant room for response on behalf of the deductivist, and there are many 
interesting questions that emerge in regards to the exact content of a weak normative 
deductivism. Here are some of the avenues for criticism that I think are open to a 
deductivist:
i) Develop a justification for a version of deductivism 
not considered in the categorization scheme.
ii) Challenge the viability of the categorization scheme 
as a way to understand deductivism.
iii) Develop a convincing case for ontological 
deductivism.
iv) Come up with empirical evidence that establishes 
weak psychological deductivism.
v) Show that the standard definition of argument is 
inadequate and should be supplanted by a definition 
that equates argument with deductive validity.
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vi) Develop a method to evaluate defeasible inferences 
within a deductivist framework.
This list of possible rejoinders may not be exhaustive, although these are some 
possibilities that come to my mind for how a deductivist might respond to the line of 
thought advanced in this thesis. I do not think that any of these rejoinders are promising, 
although I want to remain open to the possibility that one of them might work out.
I think the most interesting questions concerning the future prospects of 
deductivism concern weak normative deductivism and the extent to which inferences 
may be adequately evaluated through deductive reconstruction. For instance, what is the 
role of deductive validity in argumentation? When is it appropriate to use the deductive 
standard of evidence? Are deductively valid inferences on one end of a spectrum of 
inferential strength? Or, are they one type of inference amongst others types? If the 
latter, how many alternative types of inference might there be and how are they related to 
deductively valid inferences? Which arguments can be evaluated by reconstructing them 
to be deductively valid? Which cannot? In my view these are all questions worth future 
investigation. While the initial inclination that some form of deductivism could be 
applied to evaluate all inferences seems to be a sound philosophical instinct, the evidence 
seems to indicate that such a version of deductivism will not work. However, deductive 
arguments remain an important type o f argument and there is much room to explore 
exactly what their importance is and ought to be.
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